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I. Introduction 
While the liberalisation of many formerly regulated industries like banks, airlines or 
telecommunications has moved swiftly into the era of competition, often with rivalling technologies 
and phenomena of leapfrogging, some infrastructure services based on networks encounter severe 
obstacles in the implementation of competitive markets. After prominent failures, liberalisation has 
completely stalled in water services, and opening up the railroads is hampered by unresolved questions 
of track ownership and subsidisation of public transportation. The electricity sector is somewhat in a 
hybrid position. While legislators in a diverse set of countries ratified and, at least partially, 
implemented competitive elements especially in the wholesale segment of the electricity sector in the 
second half of the 1990s, many governments who planned reforms have become more sceptical about 
the actual benefits of power sector liberalisation—exacerbated by the regulatory failure in 
California—and remain outspokenly reluctant to implement any far-reaching restructuring of the 
industry. In addition, regulatory practices within the group of countries that have liberalised have not 
yet converged to a broadly accepted model of market design, and the phase of experimentation seems 
far from over.  
The two major economic powers in the Western world, the European Union
1 and the USA, 
departed with an ambitious agenda of liberalisation of the electricity supply industry in the mid-1990s. 
Based on apparent inefficiencies of the traditional rate-of-return regulation and consistent with 
economic theory emphasising the overall welfare benefits of a market-based approach (see e.g. 
Joskow and Schmalensee 1983), that initial parallel movement has resulted in strikingly different 
regulatory outcomes: The European Union’s internal electricity market is plagued by horizontal and 
vertical market power within the member states, it suffers from insufficient cross-border transmission 
capacity—but it incrementally evolves into a joint market with the harmonisation and standardisation 
of rules and practices across countries and a strong institutional backing from the European 
Commission in the context of the larger project of a unified, borderless economic area. In contrast, the 
regulatory landscape in the United States is split between functioning and expanding competitive 
wholesale markets in the North-Eastern part of the country and in Texas’ independent grid, a hybrid 
market in California, and a range of traditional service models in the South-East and North-West. 
How is it possible that a geographically intertwined but culturally, linguistically and institutionally 
diverse group of countries without a centralised sector authority achieves a more homogeneous 
institutional arrangement than a single nation state with a federal regulatory agency for energy? Which 
mechanisms foster regulatory convergence in the EU, and how do they differ from the processes that 
characterise the incremental expansion of the North-Eastern market model in the USA? The objective 
of this paper is to understand why the developments in the USA and in Europe have materialised in 
such different shapes. For that purpose, we aim to analyse the impact of agents and structures on the 
respective sector architectures. In particular, we want to answer the following questions: (1) Which 
roles do different agents play in the regulatory bargaining process? Do they act as a force or 
counterforce towards convergence? (2) Given the capital intensity and historical embeddedness of the 
electricity sector as a network industry in the public domain, do legal, political or economic—more 
generally: institutional—structures induce path-dependence and impede a move towards a 
standardised design? (3) Combining insights of questions (1) and (2), can we characterise and possibly 
distinguish the dynamics and mechanisms of regulatory convergence in the EU and the USA and 
deduce a prediction on the future evolution? 
                                                      
1   The European Union is a political construct that does not include all countries in Europe – most notable exceptions are 
Norway and Switzerland and a range of countries at the Eastern limits –, but our analysis considers the repercussions of 
the EU’s decisions in respect to electricity relevant to all countries in the common grid area defined by the UCTE.  Jens Weinmann 
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II. Models of Regulatory Competition—a Literature Overview  
The development of electricity sector liberalisation in Europe and the USA bears attributes of a 
process of regulatory competition, i.e. an intentional selection among different regimes. First, because 
there are competing models of electricity sector regulation on a global scale, including the traditional 
rate-of-return approach, single-buyer regimes, and a whole range of new market architectures 
composed of interchangeable or complementary modules of zonal or nodal transmission pricing, 
bilateral or compulsory spot markets, day-ahead markets, secondary markets for ancillary services, 
implicit or explicit auction mechanisms for transmission bottlenecks, etc. Second, state legislators in 
the USA and governments of EU member states have, as opposed to political decisionmakers in 
developing or transition countries (see Stiglitz 2002: 42 for a discussion), some political leverage to 
decide which market design and mode of regulation they want to adopt.  
Loosely following the evolutionary paradigm of ‘variation - selection - retention’ that Campbell 
(1969) applied to socio-cultural systems
2, regulatory competition exhibits dynamics of trial-and-error 
learning and of what he calls ‘convergent evolution’ (1969: 78): the emergence of common forms 
with—in our case—a potential for regulatory convergence on a single market design. The two most 
prominent approaches to describe the dynamics of regulatory competition are difficult to apply to the 
electricity sector, though: Theories of a ‘race to the bottom’ and a ‘race to the top’ have been used to 
explain how national, regional and international regulation converges towards a low-level or high-
level equilibrium. The race to the bottom depicts a phenomenon commonly referred to as the Delaware 
effect, because the US state Delaware has succeeded to attract most incorporations of publicly traded 
companies due to its attractive corporate laws (Cary 1974, Bebchuk 1992). Especially in the regulation 
of the environment and labour laws, the theory expects a gradual erosion of stricter standards because 
of competitive pressures. On the other hand, the ‘race to the top’ in regulation—the ‘California effect,’ 
as it is coined in response to California’s pioneering role in implementing stricter environmental laws 
than other states—relies in its underlying mechanism on a coalition between public interest groups and 
local firms: In a business environment composed of wealthy nations/states, companies seek a 
competitive advantage by exporting their higher domestic standards to less regulated markets, often 
with the support of non-governmental organisations who pursue their own value-driven agenda (see 
e.g. Vogel 1995). Evidence for both phenomena can be found in specific regulatory modules of the 
electricity sector, for example environmental restrictions for the emissions of both local and global 
pollutants, and safety standards for system stability: The race to the bottom may occur in regional 
markets, where individual countries are requested to lower their standards, because they are 
considered a competitive disadvantage directed against competing firms from neighbouring countries, 
while the race to the top may be induced by governments seeking voter support, in particular after 
structural difficulties of the system like a major blackout or an accident in a power plant. However, 
neither the ‘race to the top’ nor the ‘race to the bottom’ theories are suitable for explaining a 
convergence of electricity market regimes, because the implementation of a reform is not limited to 
the ratification of stricter or more relaxed laws. It rather involves the creation of genuinely new 
institutions, including a market operator, a system for the dispatch of power plants, and often a new or 
restructured regulatory agency.  
The two race theories may capture some dynamics of supplementary or peripheral regulation, 
whereas an explanation of the shape of core institutions or mechanisms of a new market design has to 
be based on less unidimensional approaches. Going beyond a simple duality, Tiebout’s (1956) model 
of regulatory competition treats laws as some sort of public goods which are provided by a supply 
side, namely any jurisdiction, in response to a specific demand by those who ‘consume’ the laws. His 
model could potentially be further extended to the creation of regulatory institutions. He emphasises 
that, first, decentralised decision-making leads to greater efficiency, because lawmakers can react 
                                                      
2   His analogy emphasises the organisational learning component and thereby adopts a Lamarckian rather than Darwinian 
argument (see Campbell 1969: 73 for a discussion on that matter). Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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more accurately to the expectations of their constituencies. Second, consumers exhibit the mobility to 
leave their jurisdiction in case that they are dissatisfied with the local regulation. The result is an 
efficient equilibrium, as opposed to an extreme bottom or top case, in which demand and supply of 
regulation match in a version of decentralised, competitive federalism. Tiebout’s model contains some 
assumptions that may not fully reflect reality, in particular ‘jurisdictional latitude’ in the selection of 
regulatory laws, which means, according to Radaelli (2004: 2), that jurisdictions cannot be limited in 
the production of their laws by external constraints. Nonetheless, Tiebout’s race towards a local 
equilibrium captures the notion of geographic differences and diverging equilibria for different 
constituencies and their particular needs, thereby providing an explanation based on neoclassical 
reasoning—and not evolutionary analogies—why regulatory convergence does not always occur. 
The effect of organisational (or institutional) learning based on practices in other jurisdictions—
policy ‘duplication’– collides with Tiebout’s model, although it constitutes a major component of 
convergence in the regulatory processes of a globalised world (see e.g. Ikenberry 1990, Henisz et al. 
2004). It is even more important than the impact of military or economic coercion, international 
negotiations or unidirectional capacity building, according to Braithwaite and Drahos (2000). The 
authors introduce the notion of ‘modelling’ and define it as ‘action(s) that constitute a process of 
displaying, symbolically interpreting and copying conceptions of action (and the process itself).’ 
(2000: 581) In that progress, governments ‘routinely misunderstand and misrepresent what they are 
modelling’ (2000: 590), though, which gives rise to a multitude of regulatory phenotypes despite one 
underlying model. Braithwaite and Drahos emphasise that economic or political power relations are 
not the single most influential factor for the success of a regulatory model, but it is also the model 
itself that counts. Radaelli (2004: 12) agrees: ‘A promoter may have less power than well-endowed 
pressure groups. But this weakness may be compensated by the power of the model.’ Hence, beyond 
the competition between different interest groups, be it on a national or international level, the quality 
of a model may emerge as a supplementary factor in regulatory competition. 
The races to the top or bottom or towards a local regulatory equilibrium assume that the system is 
fully flexible to reach the desired state. Criticism towards this dynamic assumption stems from the 
micro and the macro level. On the one hand, Braithwaite and Drahos see limits of the implementation 
of regulatory regimes in the restrictions that bounded rationality imposes on actors: ‘Histories of 
globalization involve complex networked actions which means that few, if any, actors have the 
synoptic capacity to be rational in the way rational choice would have it.’ (2000: 30) On the macro 
level, the systemic and multidimensional character of regulation may exhibit forms of inertia and path-
dependence, both in respect to legal and political procedures as well as to the infrastructure 
component—the hardware, so to speak—, which is not fully covered by the theories discussed above 
but constitutes an important element in evolutionary approaches. Prominent proponents of path-
dependence include North (1990) in economic theory and Roe (1996) in law. Path-dependence is 
characterised by ‘lock-in’ effects: Once that a specific solution to a problem or organisational structure 
is chosen, it becomes more costly, if not technically impossible, to change it, even when the solution 
or structure proves to be less efficient than a different one which has not been put into practice. North 
identifies transaction costs as the main inhibitor of allocative efficiency (1990: 86), whereas Roe 
points to the relative success of the survival of a regime, for example in the case of different 
organisational models of corporate governance in industrialised countries: ‘Even if each national 
business system produces roughly equivalent governance results, the systems have not yet converged 
to have identical institutions. Rather, each system has solved basic problems by modifying its own 
path-dependent institutions’ (1996: 657) For Roe, the coexistence of different regimes can be seen as a 
result of systemic inertia in times of stability and continuity, only disrupted and put into question by 
catastrophes and crises: ‘Nothing important might happen except in crisis. Institutions and rules would 
be comparatively rigid until a shock hits the system […] What survives is what is best adapted to 
persist during the crisis; once the survivors survive the crisis and the maladapted become extinct, 
nothing much important happens until the next crisis.’ (1996: 663) For North, the hegemony of (what 
he calls) informal constraints remains dominant even when discontinuous or radical changes like Jens Weinmann 
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revolutions occur: ‘A deep-seated cultural inheritance that underlies many informal constraints’ 
transforms revolutionary attempts into compromises with the old system, thereby generating ‘a new 
equilibrium that is far less revolutionary.’ (1990: 91)  
How well do the theories and models that have been presented above explain regulatory 
convergence and the diverging history of electricity sector liberalisation in Europe and the USA? As 
previously mentioned, the unidimensional race-to-the-bottom or top theories largely fail to capture the 
complexity of institutional differences between regulatory regimes. Roe’s and North’s legal and 
institutional path-dependence could be expected to have an impact in continental Europe, where nation 
states were shaped independently over the last two centuries and have just recently started growing 
together, and less so in the United States, which exists as a single nation with a federal government for 
a roughly equal amount of time. However, in respect to regulatory idiosyncrasies, path-dependence 
seems more pronounced in the USA than in Europe, a phenomenon that will be investigated in detail 
in the next two sections. In contrast, the relative homogeneity of the US states under the umbrella of a 
federal government could imply a stronger effect of modelling (and subsequent convergence) of 
successful practices across states—with the states acting as ‘regulatory laboratories’—thus rather 
predicting an opposite outcome than empirical evidence suggests. Tiebout’s equilibrium model 
acknowledges local optima and comes closer to the notion of decentralised ‘regulatory competition’ 
that characterises the current state of liberalisation in the US. But can it fully explain why some core 
features of the North-Eastern model of ‘organised’ markets expand predominantly in their immediate 
neighbourhood and are not copied in geographically more distant areas of the country? Apparently, the 
above-mentioned approaches to characterise regulatory competition fail to depict some of the 
interaction between different levels of political decision-making and provide an incomplete picture of 
the dynamic complexity of electricity sector reforms. More generally, Radaelli (2004: 19) writes: 
‘Fresh theoretical and empirical work should abandon the elusive notions of ‘races’, ‘top’ and 
‘bottom’, drop the emphasis on ‘final directions’, and pay more attention to the actors and processes of 
[regulatory] competition. This is a new direction: conventional models are still informed by ‘black-
box’ approaches where economic incentives for competition turn into races without explaining what 
happens in the box, who acts and how.’ In the subsequent sections, we will open the ‘black box’ and 
try to disseminate and disentangle the evolution in the USA and continental Europe. We will start with 
an analysis of the major agents in the top-down direction (section III), then turn to the bottom-up 
reaction of interest groups (IV) and the impact of epistemic communities (V), thereafter examine the 
effect of technical and legal structures (VI), before graphically summarising the main propositions 
(VII) and giving an outlook on future developments (VIII).  
III. Top-Down Inducement, State Reactions, and Second-Best Strategies 
Electricity sector liberalisation has often been described as an ideologically induced top-down system 
alteration. In the EU, the European Commission is the entity in charge of implementing the internal 
electricity market. In the USA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has issued several 
orders that pushed for institutional transformation and reform. In both cases, the top-down approach 
has faced substantial hurdles and resistance from the entities in charge of implementation, i.e. in the 
EU the member countries and in the US the individual states. Consequently, the Commission and 
FERC have found alternative paths of implementation of their policies. We will first discuss the 
European case and then the United States. 
III.A Top-Down Inducement in the European Union 
Of all regional organisations across the globe—including NAFTA, ASEAN, the Mercosur and the 
South-African Development Community (SADC)—, the European Union has the greatest enforcement 
powers and the most resourceful institutional endowment. Scholars call the EU polity a ‘regulatory 
state’ (Majone 1996), because the EU limits its role to the facilitation and setting-up of market rules, at Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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least in the energy field, as opposed to nation states which have additional means to decide over 
redistributive issues. The liberalisation process of the electricity sector within the EU was initially 
based on a consensus between the heads of the member states and has subsequently been translated 
into internal energy market directives in 1996 and 1998 and refined in 2003. Since then the European 
Commission acts like a watchdog over the progress of reforms and has made multiple attempts to 
force member states to implement specific regulatory features, like independent regulatory agencies, 
or encourage countries to open their markets to new entrants and outside competitors.  
For instance, when liberalising its electricity market, Germany chose a light-handed approach with 
members of the industry and the government trying to find a round-table consensus about market 
rules, instead of creating an independent regulatory agency. A regime based on negotiated third-party 
access was established. However, the European Commission insisted on the need of an independent 
regulatory agency and a regulated access system. Eventually, the German government agreed, created 
a Federal Network Agency, the Bundesnetzagentur, and shifted the main responsibilities for market 
surveillance from the Federal Cartel Office to the Bundesnetzagentur. Although a similar regulatory 
agency had already existed for a number of years in the German telecommunications sector, the 
compliance with the EU directive presented a significant shift in both mentality and institutional 
design from a post-WW II consensus-based functioning of the electricity sector to a more Anglo-
American style of regulation.  
The EU also uses the electricity platform as an instrument for pursuing political interests in its 
foreign policy. By extending its reach into the South-East European states of former Yugoslavia, 
Albania, Romania and Bulgaria, it has created the so-called Athens Process and dedicates substantial 
institutional and financial aid to the development of a regional electricity market. The foremost 
objective of the Athens Forum is the technical integration of South-East Europe’s grid into the main 
transmission system of the EU, managed by the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of 
Electricity (UCTE), but secondary goals may include a pacification and regional integration of former 
war adversaries to prevent further conflicts. An electricity trader
3 dealing with South-East Europe 
comments: ‘What is interesting about energy is that the EU is using energy as its first tool to build the 
EU here [in South-East Europe], because they are forcing the countries outside the EU to adopt EU 
standards years before they get in […] Energy is right at the heart of it.’ A local expert
4 responds to the 
question whether the process of convergence will be accomplished in the next five to ten years: ‘It will 
happen much earlier, definitely, because there is a so-called Athens Forum, within this process is 
controlled by the European Commission, and they force all the countries in the region to do it even 
faster than the Western European countries did.’  
Official EU documents hint towards an element of externally induced convergence. For example, 
the Electricity Transition Strategy, which was adopted by the Ministerial Council in December 2005, 
states that ‘the European Commission put forward a strategy outlining the principles and the 
institutional necessities on which the development of the regional electricity market should be based. 
All South East European countries agreed to adopt European Union legislation and to set up a 
structure to monitor the operation of the market,’ while ‘the Treaty Parties agreed in an approach that 
outlines basic market design elements notably requirements of the EU legislation.’ (Ministerial 
Council 2005: 3 and 16) [italics added]. An indirect critique of the ‘harmonisation’ efforts of the EU is 
expressed in a discussion paper of the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), which 
mentions several conditions that have proven to be ‘fundamental requirements for the development of 
a liquid, well functioning wholesale power market,’ including a supply-side surplus, non-
discriminatory access to domestic high voltage transmission, reasonable transparency of information, 
etc. EFET states: ‘The […] pre-conditions listed above seem to us both from experience elsewhere, 
and in the South-Eastern Europe context, axiomatic. It follows that any attempt to superimpose a 
                                                      
3   Interview undertaken in Summer 2005 in London. The interviewee remains anonymous. 
4   See previous footnote. Jens Weinmann 
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standard market design across a number of countries, at a time when some of them still do not display 
basic fulfilment of all of these pre-conditions, may be doomed to failure.’ (2004: 2) [italics added]  
Proposition 1: The European Commission uses the binding character of directives to harmonise 
the core institutional design within its member states and pursue an expansionary policy by 
imposing internal standards on potential accession candidates. 
III.B ‘Economic Patriotism’ of the Member States 
Regulatory convergence may be in conflict with national interests, especially when a critical 
infrastructure service like electricity is concerned. The EU member states undergo cycles of pro-
European and anti-European rhetorics. Even though the general direction is towards greater 
integration, ‘economic patriotism’ is a powerful, populist counterforce to an identification with the 
fairly abstract idea of a union that tries to overcome the last 200 years of successful ideological, 
cultural and linguistic nation-building by creating a multi-faceted demographic colossus with non-
democratic and seemingly distant decision-making processes. Given the substantial member state 
discretion and the Union’s consensus-based enforcement powers in the implementation of European 
directives, an instinctive protectionist reaction can almost be expected. Glachant and Leveque (2005: 
4) write in respect to the internal energy market: ‘The EU national diversity is first and foremost a 
predictable result of the nature of the compromises between the Member States, formalized by the 
European Community in the first directive of 1996. According to the insightful commentary of L. 
Hancher, this first directive allowed nearly everything, except… an integrated internal market! The 
Second Directive (2003) and its companion regulations managed to reduce the scope of this diversity, 
but not eliminate it.’  
France is the foremost example of an anti-liberalisation agenda in the electricity sector. Heritier 
(2001: 841) describes the French strategy in the planning phase of the internal market: ‘The French 
government was concerned that the EdF public service model would not survive the liberalization of 
the energy sector […] However, in basically resisting liberalization, France saw a two-fold danger: for 
one, in the absence of a Council policy, the ECJ [European Court of Justice] could rule against the 
French import and export monopoly; second, under its competition law […], the Commission could 
liberalize by issuing a directive bypassing the Council. In this situation the French government 
proposed the single-buyer model, which offered the best possibility for maintaining the existing 
practice.’
5 Similarly, in Germany all major parties as well as ministries on both federal and Länder 
level expressed scepticism towards the liberalisation of the sector, referring to questions about the 
security of supply, the universal service obligation and environmental protection (Eising 2002: 99).  
Within and during the EU negotiation process, governments learn how to adapt to new 
circumstances and develop strategies to pursue their national interests, though. Eising (2002) identifies 
the ‘incremental negotiation technique’ of the Council of the European Union as a major factor in 
policy learning. It not only reveals each country’s preference set—which could be explained by a 
fairly static intergovernmental theory of policy negotiations—, but the incremental debate also 
‘increases the knowledge about each element of the often highly complex regulatory proposals.’ 
(Eising 2002: 111) Going further, it could be postulated that while momentum for the internal 
electricity market gathered pace on a European level, governments learned how to transform their 
strategy sets from initial opposition to a more subtle approach of formally embracing the concept of 
liberalisation while pursuing an agenda to protect the values of the old system and the status of their 
utilities. For the case of France, Finon (2001: 3) identifies the balancing act as, on the one side, ‘to 
accept the regulations relating to competition, but as little as possible, the aim being to maintain as far 
as possible public services principles, the capacity for State action in matters of energy policy, and the 
strategic resources of the historical operator in European and international competition by preserving 
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its integration,’ while on the other side ‘to preserve the legitimacy of the sector integration inside the 
public electricity enterprise by guaranteeing fairness in competition, by the transparent rules of access 
and the presence of an autonomous and empowered regulator.’ Indeed, after its initial resistance 
France subsequently complied, albeit hesitantly, with all the directives’ orders. It opened the electricity 
market from 22% in 1999 to 67% in July 2004, created a regulatory agency and a ‘quasi-independent’ 
(Finon 2001: 14) transmission system operator. Although Finon (2001: 18) comments that ‘it cannot 
easily be said that the industrial structures and market rules in France have the best profile by 
guaranteeing new institutional arrangements,’ the French government has refrained from full non-
compliance and has opened the path to regulatory convergence.  
Similar developments can be observed in Portugal and Spain. Jordana et al. (2005: 16) comment: 
‘Liberalization at the national level in electricity moved swiftly beyond the requirements of the EU 
regime […] What is most puzzling is the extent to which governments and national communities could 
adhere to EU rules on the one hand but find particular ways to continue to be engaged in mercantilist 
policies on the other.’ The authors identify the most common feature of ambivalence towards greater 
integration: ‘While adherence to the rules of EU regimes constrained uncompetitive behaviour by 
governments and market incumbents, it did not curtail it. In fact, there are still wide margins for 
strategic behaviour by politicians to pursue their ‘national interest’ policies. The two countries [Spain 
and Portugal] stuck to their ‘national champions’ policies.’ (ibid.)  
‘National champions’ are local firms that are domestically protected and externally promoted. 
Theories of strategic trade policy—‘the government becomes the first player in a multi-stage game and 
can influence the equilibrium outcome of the game played by private agents by altering the set of 
credible actions open to them’ (see Brander and Spencer 1983)—and endogenous growth theory 
(Lucas 1988, Romer 1986) deliver the theoretical rationale for a protectionist agenda, further fuelled 
by general anti-globalisation resentments and fears of job loss and structural change within the firms. 
Examples of national champions range from EdF to E.On, Endesa Spain and Eletricidade de Portugal. 
Although European electricity markets are opening up to new entrants in all countries, cross-border 
transmission capacity is often scarce and limits full integration and competition. In that environment, 
national champions can use their free cash flows to expand internationally, like EdF and Tractebel in 
Latin American, and E.On in Eastern Europe, sometimes at the expense of domestic final consumers: 
The German anti-trust authority, for example, follows closely the interest group theory of regulation 
suggested by Stigler (1971) and Becker (1983): ‘When evaluating ‘national champions’ one should be 
aware that the perception of facts may be distorted because the beneficiaries of state intervention are 
more conscious of its effects and thus make themselves heard in the political process to a greater 
extent than those who suffer from state intervention.’ (Monopolkommission 2003: 578)  
Governments may use domestic policy tools as a way to promote their utilities—often even against 
the advice of their own anti-trust authorities. One prominent case is the ministerial authorisation of 
German utility E.On taking over gas utility Ruhrgas, which was opposed by the German antitrust 
commission and the state of Nordrhein-Westfahlen’s court of appeal. Despite two adverse special 
reports from the Monopolkommission and a temporary suspension induced by the court of appeal, the 
Federal Minister of Economics pushed the merger in an out-of-court settlement.  
The European Commission has only limited authority to prevent governments from establishing 
national champions. In particular, the right to intervene in a member state’s anti-trust policy only 
exists if more than 36% of the joint business of the two firms (according to EU accounting rules) is 
undertaken in other European nations. However, repercussions on a European dimension, especially 
along the strategic energy value chain of electricity and gas, might occur even in cases below that 
threshold. In respect to E.On and Ruhrgas, Glachant and Leveque (2005) comment: ‘It is unfortunate 
the Commission did not claim any jurisdiction over this [the E.On-Ruhrgas] merger. Merger cases 
EnBW/EdF and EdP/GdP have shown that the Commission is not ready to be lenient in approving 
alliances that may hinder the liberalisation electricity process.’ Apart from Portugal’s merger between 
the main gas supplier and the main electricity company (which follows the lines of the E.On-Ruhrgas Jens Weinmann 
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case), the authors refer to EdF’s acquisition of 34% of German utility EnBW’s shares, in which it 
ordered EdF to sell almost 6000 MW of capacity—but only as virtual power plants (VPPs), not as a 
real divestiture (VPPs will be discussed in section VI.B on property rights, see also Willems 2006 for 
a theoretical treatment). Newbery (2002: 919) identifies the discretion left to member states as one of 
the commission’s major problems: ‘The EU lacks the necessary legislative and regulatory power to 
mitigate generator market power.’ 
The notion of creating national champions is, of course, not a feature of all EU member states. For 
example, Holland and the UK have less concentrated ownership structures. However, most of the 
countries follow a dual approach by officially and legally implementing the directives for energy 
liberalisation while allowing national champions to emerge. In the case of France, Finon (2001: 13) 
states: ‘France has to manage to preserve its particular features (wide public service obligations and 
vertical integration) by demonstrating its ability to avoid competition discrimination and being 
proactive in the removal of direct barriers to cross-border trade, as is the case in the Florence process 
of access rules harmonisation.’ The consensus-oriented, iterative process of EU negotiations and the 
resulting incomplete-contract character of the Directives strengthen the autonomy and discretion of 
member state governments in the interpretation of Directives, thereby opening possibilities of political 
partisanship in favour of domestic utilities.  
Proposition 2: The majority of European governments relies more on a weak implementation of 
anti-trust policies than on outright opposition to regulatory convergence in order to pursue 
strategies of ‘economic patriotism.’ 
III.C The Commission’s Second-Best Strategy: Informal Regulatory Networks 
The EU’s economic mission—creating a single European market across its member states—is almost 
inevitably ideologically intertwined with a convergence of regulatory regimes, because borderless 
trade is facilitated by a harmonisation in rules and practices. However, the European Commission as 
the implementing body crucially depends on the approval of the member states. Eberlein and Grande 
(2005: 91) observe: ‘On the one hand, thus far the political resistance of member states has not 
allowed any far-reaching transfer of regulatory powers to a supranational ‘regulatory state’; while, on 
the other hand, the EU framework of rules to which member state regulatory regimes are subject does 
not fully match the functional need for uniform EU rules.’ The authors argue that ‘the resulting 
regulatory gap is partly filled by new types of informal institutions, the transnational regulatory 
networks. In certain circumstances, these regulatory networks offer a back road to the informal 
Europeanisation of public regulation.’ [italics in the original] (ibid.) 
The electricity sector provides an excellent example of this back road to cross-national 
convergence. Jorge Vasconcelos, the former director of the Portuguese regulatory agency and 
president of the Council of European Energy Regulators, confirms the existence of a regulatory gap 
within the EU procedures (2005: 2):  
The first Internal Energy Market (IEM) directives defined some common rules to be applied by all 
Member States in order to open up their energy markets […] However, these directives provided 
little guidance as regards cross-border energy trade, development of regional markets, interaction 
with non-EU markets, development of interconnectors, supra-national integration of energy 
markets, etc. Hence, a ‘regulatory gap’ between national markets and the EU internal energy 
market emerged.  
He observes the tendency of establishing diverging regulatory regimes:  
Looking at the way legislators and/or regulators started making use of this freedom [to shape their 
domestic markets], it was soon recognised that implementation of the ‘common rules’ directives 
could lead to incompatible trading arrangements and block cross-border trade if nothing was done. 
In fact, parallel liberalisation of 15 energy markets did not ensure the compatibility—and even less 
convergence or integration—of these markets. (2005: 7)  Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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Vasconcelos then describes the development towards a transnational regulatory network: ‘The 
European Commission realized the difficulties arising from the omissions of the first IEM directives 
and the need for some degree of institutional co-ordination in order to overcome the existing 
“regulatory gap”.’ (2005: 8) In 1998, the European Electricity Regulation Forum, later called the 
Florence Forum, was initiated, and in 2000—within the framework of the Florence Forum—the 
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) was founded, mainly as a self-initiative of the 
regulators to discuss urgent topics more efficiently than in the larger Florence Forum, which includes 
multiple stakeholders like producers, traders, suppliers, consumers and market operators. As an 
official interface between the CEER and the European Commission, the European Regulators Group 
for Gas and Electricity (ERGEG) was established in 2003, whose purpose is to ‘advise and assist the 
Commission in consolidating the internal energy market.’ With the creation of ERGEG, a direct link 
was created between national regulatory authorities and the Commission, circumventing and omitting 
the institutional path via the respective governments. The cooperation between ERGEG and the 
Commission has certainly benefited from the pro-competitive ideological underpinnings of the 
national regulators. Compared with the equivalent institutions in the USA, the public utilities 
commissions, which have been serving their local constituencies in some cases over almost a century 
by tariff-setting based on rate-of-return regulation, the European regulators came into existence 
parallel to the liberalisation movement, with the UK regulator and the Norwegian agency being the 
pioneers in the first half of the 1990s, many other European countries following in the second half of 
the decade, and France and Germany initiating agencies in the new millennium. The principal raison 
d’être of the national regulatory agencies was the quest for a liberalised national or, later, EU-wide 
energy market. Hence, the regulatory gap was reduced by a chain of technical co-ordination and 
advisory committees favourable to liberalisation.  
Eberlein and Grande (2005: 101) comment: ‘The most important resource for the informal co-
ordination through networks is neither law nor money, but information. Particularly in the area of 
regulatory policy, which overwhelmingly involves knowledge-based, technically specialized areas of 
regulation, the availability and dissemination of credible information that meets professional technical 
criteria proves to be the most effective instrument for soft control.’ Harmonisation also occurs on the 
individual level in some sort of institutional isomorphism: ‘This inclusion in European-orchestrated 
networks transforms national representatives from “locals” into “cosmopolitans”, thus smoothing the 
way for a certain convergence of national regulation.’ [italics in the original] (ibid.) In the electricity 
sector, the absence of a joint European regulatory agency for energy is overcome by increasing 
coordination between regulators in different subregions, including France and the Benelux, Central 
Eastern Europe, or the Iberian Peninsula. Coordination was particularly fostered by so-called ‘Mini-
Fora,’ which were established at the 11
th Florence Forum Meeting and met from December 2004 for a 
limited period of time on a regular basis, discussing specific questions of closer regulatory cooperation 
within subregions, mainly on cross-border congestion management in the transmission network with 
the aim of the introduction of day-ahead co-ordinated market based mechanisms, such as auctions. 
Market coupling between France, the Netherlands and Belgium has since been implemented as a joint 
initiative between the respective regulatory agencies and power exchanges. The creation of an Iberian 
electricity market was envisaged in 2001, but it took several years and government changes in Spain 
and Portugal, until a joint Council of Regulators, comprising the representatives of both countries’ 
securities and energy regulatory agencies, was launched in 2005 and was given technical and 
administrative authority to establish a common organised spot market, located in Spain, and a financial 
derivatives market, located in Portugal.  
Proposition 3: If regulatory convergence cannot be fully achieved on a regional level, informal 
regulatory networks based on technical co-ordination of specialised state agencies are created, 
and the integration of sub-regions is fostered by those networks. Jens Weinmann 
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III.D FERC’s Failed Top-Down Inducement in the United States  
In respect to its institutional structure, the regulatory energy landscape of the United States seems at 
first sight like a projection of the EU and its member states on a single but decentrally organised 
country: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) decrees standards and suggests features 
of a standardised market design, while individual states and the state regulatory agencies, the Public 
Utilities Commissions (PUCs) follow more or less closely the orders. A more thorough analysis of the 
decision-making mechanisms reveals, however, that substantial differences exist between the EU and the US. 
With Order 888, FERC opened up the individual transmission systems to third-party access in 
1996, but when it tried to impose a standard market design (SMD) based on the fairly successful rules 
of the PJM (Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland) market in 2002, it failed to find political support in 
many jurisdictions. For example, Gray Davis, the then-governor of California, called it ‘nothing less 
than a hostile takeover of California’s electric grid by the federal government,’ as quoted by Hunt and 
Sioshansi (2002: 38), who expand that ‘the governor’s four-member appointees to the CAISO’s board 
(Californian Independent System Operator) voted unanimously to fight FERC on several fronts.’ 
Opposition was also expressed by representatives of utilities like PNGC Power, a small cooperative 
from Oregon: ‘Historically, the various regional electrical systems have grown into very different 
forms to meet regional topography, climates, load distributions, generating system type and ownership 
patterns. There is no need to implement the entire SMD in parts of the country that are not suffering 
the perceived ills that SMD remedies […] FERC should honor and recognize the legitimate 
differences in regional electrical systems.’ (Scott 2002: 92) Morrison (2005) speaks of ‘some 
legitimate parochialism’: ‘Regulators in low cost states have a statutory obligation to look out for the 
interests of consumers in their states. They cannot legally support a policy that will lower electricity 
prices in a neighbouring state if it does so at the expense of consumers in their own state.’  
The intention of FERC to force convergence in market designs across the US was doomed to fail, 
in parts because of its messianic approach—‘no region has been exempt from market design flaws of 
one type or another […] Only standardization of electricity markets design will solve these problems. 
Our goal is […] to raise the quality of all electricity markets simultaneously’ (FERC 2002: 3)—, in 
parts because of the loss of momentum in electricity market liberalisation, which was exacerbated by 
what Malloy (2004) calls the ‘four horseman of the apocalypse,’ namely the California blackouts, the 
collapse of Enron, the meltdown of trading activities, and the 2003 blackout in the North-Eastern USA. 
A watered-down version, issued in the FERC White Paper on Regional Markets in 2003, accepted 
the principle of subsidiarity and gave ‘more room for regional implementation’ (DeJong 2004: 14). 
Since then, a parallel development takes place across the country: a small number of regional markets 
with a centralised dispatch and competitive features on the wholesale level, especially in the North-
East, are prospering and growing, while many states, mainly in the South-East and North-West, have 
no intention to implement competitive elements in their electricity sector. Texas with a separate grid 
entered late into the liberalisation process, but learned from the failures of some of its predecessors, 
whereas California is stuck in a hybrid system with competitive elements but also a legacy of anti-
competitive long-term contracts signed in the aftermath of the major supply crisis in 2001. 
None of the ‘four horseman of the apocalypse’ has yet appeared in the EU and hampered its 
liberalisation efforts, and that might explain a major difference in the dynamics of regulatory 
convergence across the Atlantic: While European regulation encourages the creation of an internal 
electricity market but delegates the technical details to inter-country expert advisory groups, FERC 
suffers from an acute problem of legitimacy in defining the overall goal of the process. Many interest 
groups express explicit scepticism against FERC’s policies. For example, a commentary by the 
Freedom & Progress Foundation, which was later published in the Electricity Journal (Lenard 2004), states: 
In the absence of Congressional action, ‘competition policy’ has been driven by FERC, which […] 
has not had a consistent policy. The current FERC has been very aggressive in pursuing its 
particular vision of electricity ‘competition,’ which, to say the least, is quite controversial […] The Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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SMD proposal provided very little flexibility. It proposed to design power markets and institutions 
at a level of detail virtually unprecedented in our economy […] In sum, SMD was a new 
centralized regulatory regime, not obviously better than the old one.  
The author comments ironically: ‘On the positive side, FERC has been sufficiently constrained so 
that it is not able to force the new model everywhere. So, to the extent that the new market design is 
not optimal for all time and every place—as the FERC apparently believes—at least it will not be in 
place everywhere.’ 
Elcon, the national association for large industrial users of electricity, claims that—despite their 
general support for liberalisation—the new markets suffer from the fact that ‘the FERC-Jurisdictional 
“Organized Markets” simply are not competitive,’ because ‘the “market rules” are simply a form of 
“competitive bidding”’, while ‘units “on the margin” (primarily gas units) set the prices for all units, 
even those coal and nuclear units that were depreciated by payments from captive ratepayers,’ and 
‘regulators keep adding additional revenue streams for generators such as ICAP, LICAP, RPM, etc. 
[mainly different forms of capacity payments] as means to assure “resource adequacy”, even though 
these schemes are not working.’ Elcon rhetorically answers its own question: ‘So what have we 
gained?—A very complicated and expensive new form of regulation—certainly NOT competition.’ 
(all comments from Anderson 2006a)  
The neo-liberal think tank Cato Institute goes even further and recommends an outright return to 
the old system: ‘The poor track record of restructuring stems from systemic problems inherent in the 
reforms themselves. We recommend total abandonment of restructuring and a more thoroughgoing 
embrace of markets than contemplated in current restructuring initiatives.’ Given the scepticism and 
anti-power liberalisation rhetorics in many jurisdictions, the institute opts for an ideological and 
institutional retreat: ‘We recognize that such reforms are politically difficult to achieve. A second-best 
alternative would be for those states that have already embraced restructuring to return to an updated 
version of the old, vertically integrated, regulated status quo.’ (Van Doren and Taylor 2004: 1) 
Although many political and corporate players agree on the superiority of competitive markets in 
principle, a diverse and broad coalition, ranging from public utilities commissions to large industrial 
users and neo-liberal think tanks, oppose the Federal Commission’s quest for standardisation and 
convergence—at least under the designs that have been suggested up to now.  
Proposition 4: The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has lost the credibility and 
institutional support to effectively implement a standardised market design. 
III.E FERC’s Second-Best Strategy: Regional Transmission Organisations  
Since the top-down approach of federal regulatory standardisation has failed, the subsequent level in 
the hierarchy tackles individual states or intra-US regions. In fact, FERC is still able to play a role in 
any regional aggregation, because it is responsible for inter-state transmission regulation. This is, to 
some extent, FERC’s backdoor into the process of regulatory harmonisation, and the commission is 
actively pursuing a strategy to establish regional transmission organisations (RTOs). But the focus on 
subregional integration is also based on the success of cooperation between states in implementing the 
previously mentioned ‘organised’ electricity markets, among them Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Maryland which formed the PJM pool, or the New England states.  
In 2002, FERC granted the status of the first functioning RTO in the USA to PJM
6. PJM has 
gradually expanded over time, from 10 member companies in 1993, when it was still the 
                                                      
6   PJM already existed as a joint power pool between Pennsylvania and New Jersey since 1927. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
joint capacity planning and a coordination of operating reserve requirements were launched between the five participating 
utilities, and in 1973 the PJM pool started to be centrally dispatched. In fact, during the 1970s and 80s PJM operated 
already under a pool-wide transmission tariff and a cost-based energy market within a single control area. The new Jens Weinmann 
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interconnection association, to over 400 members in 2006. It covers 13 states of the USA and the 
District of Columbia, which includes the capital Washington. It has increased the number of people 
served from 22 million in 1993 to 51 million people and integrates more than 1,000 generating 
entities. In 2004, American Electric Power (AEP), one of the bigger electric utilities in the United 
States, delivering electricity to more than 5 million customers in 11 states and owning the nation’s 
largest electricity transmission system, handed functional control of the flow of wholesale electricity 
over AEP’s high-voltage transmission lines in the company’s seven-state Eastern region over to PJM. 
In the company’s Q&A website, AEP justifies its decision in the following way:  
FERC encourages utilities to join regional transmission organizations (RTOs) to support and foster 
robust wholesale power markets. A condition of AEP’s merger in 2000 with Central & South West 
Corp. was AEP’s entry into a FERC-approved RTO. AEP chose PJM over other RTOs because it 
is the most established and mature of the FERC-approved RTOs adjacent to AEP’s eastern service 
territory and has a proven performance record.  
PJM became not only responsible for the reliability of the extended transmission system, but AEP’s 
transmission and generation operations, commercial processes and data systems have been integrated 
into those of PJM (ibid.). The joint operating agreement ‘represents a major step toward development 
of a common market, which FERC advocates,’ according to AEP’s Q&A (AEP 2006).  
Future developments of PJM are likely to include a closer cooperation with the Midwest 
Independent System Operator (MISO) to develop complementing system operations and a joint 
wholesale electricity market. The new entity would stretch over 23 states, the District of Columbia and 
the Canadian province of Manitoba. An additional expansion could include the South-West Power 
Pool (SPP), which gained RTO status in 2004. Albeit not a functioning wholesale market by itself, 
SPP revised some features, for example by substituting a zonal rate structure for transmission services 
by a real-time market based on locational marginal pricing, which is modelled on the PJM system. 
Close cooperation in seams issues, i.e. features of technical, administrative and regulatory 
incompatibilities, between PJM, the neighbouring New York pool and the New England pool is 
organised by the North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) and already fairly advanced, 
leading to further harmonisation across regions.  
US state regulation has often been described as a laboratory where new practices are tested (see e.g. 
Weiser 2003 for the case of telecommunications). The most successful design features are then 
adopted by other states or centrally on a federal level. This form of policy diffusion can still be 
observed in individual design modules like nodal pricing. However, the interregional grid structure 
(with the exception of Texas’ separate network) exacerbates the tendency that mimicking of state level 
experiments has largely been substituted by a radial expansion of regulatory policies according 
geographical proximity, most notably after the failed experiment in California.  
Proposition 5: In the USA, market design convergence follows a regional expansion pattern, 
induced by the creation of regional transmission organisations. 
IV. The Spectrum of Bottom-Up Reactions  
The European Commission’s and FERC’s attempts to implement a standardised electricity market 
design have been deviated from direct top-down strategies to a control shift towards informal 
regulatory networks and the creation of regional transmission organisations, respectively. Resistance 
(Contd.)                                                                   
competitive PJM model, introduced in 1997, suffered from several design flaws, most importantly a single-zone pricing 
approach which led to transmission congestion and was soon replaced by a nodal pricing system. Several further 
modifications of the design took place in order to improve system performance. In January 1999, daily, monthly and 
multi-monthly capacity markets were introduced, and six months later an auction market for financial transmission rights 
was established. Locational marginal prices are calculated for each node in the network every five minutes in order to 
reflect transmission congestion in the electricity pricing. In its current state, the PJM pool corresponds most closely in the 
country to what the FERC proposed in its standard market design. Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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from member state governments and public utilities commissions has been a major factor in adopting 
these alternative paths. As already emphasised in the case of the US, the political bargaining 
machinery is not limited to these subsequent levels of political decision-making, though. On the 
contrary, multiple interest groups and stakeholders try to shape the new model according to their 
preferences. The impact of these bottom-up reactions is particularly pronounced in the absence of a 
broadly accepted design template and a rather increasing than decreasing uncertainty about the overall 
benefits of systemic change.  
In this chapter, we will discuss the attitudes of major stakeholders towards regulatory convergence. 
By merging each interest group into one transatlantic section, we directly highlight the similarities and 
contrast the differences between individual positions in the USA and Europe, thus contributing to a 
better understanding why the outcome of the bargaining process has been pushed into different 
directions. In particular, we will examine the positions of traditional utilities, merchant generators, 
traders, large industrial consumers, and, last but not least, non-governmental organisations and 
consumer advocacy groups. 
IV.A Utilities 
Market design convergence may encounter opposite reactions from corporate entities: The foremost 
advantage of a harmonisation in the regulatory framework for private actors is, of course, a familiarity 
with the rules, modules and mechanisms employed in the complex handling of subsequent markets, 
real-time dispatch, transmission pricing etc., which facilitates an expansion into new territories 
without lengthy adaptation to a new regulatory architecture. Also, companies that rely on cross-border 
transactions like electricity imports and exports benefit from standardisation. However, diverging 
market designs can create a comparative advantage of local firms versus new entrants, both from 
abroad as well as local newcomers, not only by setting up complicated procedures but also by 
integrating terms and conditions favourable to the incumbent and its specific supply or transmission 
structure and resource endowment. Under the old public service model, electricity utilities generally 
enjoyed a demarcated monopoly, and it can be assumed that the predominant strategy of utilities is to 
preserve their territorial dominance against new entrants by erecting barriers of entry. In the complex 
field of electricity regulation, a cooperation between the state-level actors and the utility (or utilities) is 
not implausible, if managers, bureaucrats and politicians share a similar value system, for example 
because of the same educational background. The dilemma of French politicians to comply with 
European directives while keeping public sector principles intact, which has already been discussed in 
section III.B on nation states in the EU, provided some evidence of the difficult change in political and 
corporate culture:  
In France, the Ministry of Industry (Ministère de l’Industrie) and the national utility EdF 
dominated the domestic decision-making process. During the liberalization process, both actors 
broadly agreed on their positions. The Ministry of Industry acted mainly as the ‘sponsoring 
department’ for the national monopoly utility. Those actors favoring a comprehensive 
liberalization of the French sector—like the competition directorate in the Ministry of Economics 
and Finance, several large industrial conglomerates, and some local distributors—did not play a 
major role. (Eising 2002: 97)  
On the European level, the utilities ‘even founded an EU trade organisation to defend their 
domestic positions,’ (Eising 2002: 93) called Eurelectric. ‘In general, Eurelectric formulated a 
defensive posture in favour of the status quo and suggested a vaguely defined and minimal market 
opening to satisfy the Commission plans.’ (ibid.) Utilities can also use their knowledge how to 
influence the regulatory process to their favour: In the EU, a substantial amount of regulatory diversity 
still exists with respect to the interconnections between the individual markets (section VI.A on seams 
issues will discuss this topic in more detail). Several proposals for a harmonisation of practices are 
under discussion, including implicit and explicit auctions of cross-border transmission capacity, but no 
standardised design has yet been implemented, which gives utilities an opportunity to unilaterally Jens Weinmann 
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decree technology-related rules that fit into their strategy set and cannot be easily contested because of 
information asymmetries. For example, in a response to a consultation regarding the regional market 
integration between the wholesale electricity markets of the Netherlands, Belgium and France, 
representatives of the trading branch of Germany’s second-largest utility RWE complain:  
Especially in Belgium and France, where main parts of generation and supply are in the hand of a 
single company we can agree to the conclusion that there is a risk of market manipulation of these 
dominant market players. Moreover this fact might bear the risk to dominate the B-, F- and NL 
cross border capacities and relevant prices for buying these capacity shares. RWE Trading has a 
strong interest in having fair, liquid and well working regional markets which are—commercially 
and electrically—connected to the maximum extent. (RWE Trading 2005)  
At the same time, the European Federation of Energy Traders remarks: ‘A lot of pro-rata 
curtailments took place in the direction from Germany to France during the first months of 2005. In 
order to manage this new situation, RWE Netz and EnBW Netz decided unilaterally, without market 
consultation nor consultation with neighbouring TSOs, to implement a one-sided and uni-directional 
(Germany to France) explicit auction mechanism.’ (EFET 2005: 4) These local initiatives are certainly 
short-lived in a converging European regulatory architecture, but they may be indicative for the 
strategic options that utilities can still use, especially when they are vertically integrated. 
In the USA, the American Public Power Association (APPA), a trade association representing 
publicly-owned electric utilities (state and local ownership) and serving 43 million people, was an ‘an 
early and strong supporter of FERC’s open access transmission policy and ISO [independent system 
operator] formation.’ (APPA 2004: 3) The organisation ‘also supported the formation of properly 
structured, cost-effective RTOs, with their promise of independent and non-discriminatory 
transmission service provided under Open Access Transmission Tariffs.’ However, its representatives 
convey scepticism about one of the main features of FERC’s second-best harmonisation strategy, the 
creation of regional transmission organisation (RTOs): ‘APPA members located in RTO regions report 
substantial, across-the-board problems with spiralling RTO costs, unaccountable governance, lack of 
understanding of transmission customer and end-user needs and less-than-satisfactory service options. 
They see more and more RTO services being provided through questionable market mechanisms, and 
RTO resistance to any questioning of the economic theories underpinning these actions.’ (2004: 6) As 
a consequence, APPA issued a White Paper on electricity restructuring that pledges for adaptability 
and diversity in regulatory designs, according to technical, institutional and strategic differences: “ 
Some regions have a history of using contractual arrangements and regional institutions or 
practices to capture many of the benefits claimed for RTOs at less risk and cost, and have shown a 
willingness to pursue alternatives to enhance transmission access and the efficiency of existing 
markets. Other differences include the prevalence of jointly owned generation and transmission, 
the radial nature of transmission systems connecting remote generation to loads, the predominance 
of hydropower in the generation mix, differences in population density, 
and so forth. The organisation outspokenly opposes convergence according to the FERC proposal: 
‘The American Public Power Association (‘APPA’) believes that RTOs are not the only—and in many 
regions not the best—structure for providing non-discriminatory transmission access. Thus, regional 
diversity must be acknowledged, and more pragmatic and flexible federal transmission policies 
implemented to deal with the reality ‘on the ground.’’ (2004: 2) 
Proposition 6: Utilities in the EU and in the USA pursue a dual strategy by officially embracing 
competition while preserving or fostering regulatory diversity in their home territory. 
IV.B Merchant Generators and Traders  
Merchant generators and electricity traders are a fairly new phenomenon in the electricity sector, and 
for obvious reasons an offspring of the reforms. As new entrants into markets dominated by the Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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traditional utilities, they can be assumed to be the keenest supporters of far-reaching liberalisation and 
the creation of new trading opportunities, crucial for survival and expansion.  
In Europe, which saw new entrants in the traditional technologies of thermal generation enter rather 
through acquisitions of divested assets than through Greenfield investments, merchant generators (or 
independent power producers, which is a nomenclature more common in the European sphere) do not 
seem to have a strong independent lobby. If at all, they are absorbed by Eurelectric, whose ambivalent 
stance towards liberalisation has already been discussed in the previous section.  
There might be different reasons for the absence of an efficient lobby organisation of European 
independent power producers: Merchant generation in Europe, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom—which follows different mechanisms of regulatory evolution than continental Europe –, is 
still in its infancy. Furthermore, particular interests of IPPs might be well represented by the 
influential European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET). Special cases are the providers of 
renewable energy, which indeed have their own organisations (see next section). The situation in the 
USA seems to be the inverse of the European case: Merchant generation was starting in the 1980s, 
after PURPA allowed independent power producers (IPPs) to set up their own plants, and booming 
during the 1990s with the rise of CCGTs (combined-cycle gas turbines). IPPs are well organised in the 
Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), while electricity traders do not have their own 
organisation and seem to be a sub-chapter of the EPSA. One of the reasons for the low-key appearance 
of traders in the US might be the downfall of Enron, which provided the most successful trading 
platform during the 1990s. Hence, we will discuss EPSA’s position for the USA and EFET’s position 
for the EU. 
EPSA represents the independent power producers in the USA, whose share rose from 5% in 1998 
to 40% in 2003 (EIA 2003). The organisation’s pro-competitive stance is reflected in their positions 
towards market design: ‘It is important to keep in mind that implementation of market design elements 
on a piecemeal basis will not provide complete customer value and the reliability benefits of fully 
functioning competitive markets.’ (2005: 5) EPSA mainly backs the standard market design feature 
proposed by FERC. For instance, it endorses the centrally administered day-ahead, realtime and 
ancillary services markets, and the management of transmission congestion according to Locational 
Marginal Pricing (LMP) with a possibility to use financial transmission rights for hedging purposes: 
‘A congestion management system based on LMP continues to produce the most efficient, least cost 
and non-discriminatory results when curtailments are necessary.’ (2005: 3) Even the highly contested 
capacity markets are necessary to maintain existing generation and foster new generation investment, 
according to EPSA, ‘when energy price mitigation is a pervasive and structural feature of organized 
markets.’ However, the organisation comments that ‘this issue is integrally tied to the problems 
associated with energy mitigation and the lack of scarcity pricing in the organized markets.’ (2005: 4) 
Instead of radical changes of the existing architecture, EPSA places more lobbying efforts to ensure a 
fair access to the transmission grid for merchant generators, especially in the systems that still follow 
traditional regulation, and a non-discriminatory dispatch of its plants. As opposed to many other 
interest groups in the US (for example, the large industrial users that will be discussed below), 
merchant generators follow a strategy of general approval of the FERC-proposed market design scheme. 
Electricity trading can be pursued as over-the-counter (OTC) transactions, which corresponds to 
some extent to bilateral contracts, and trading in organised markets. In the US, trading in organised 
markets has been severely battered by past events. ISDA, the American International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, whose contracts are widely used in energy trading, comments (2003: 9):  
The effects of Enron’s bankruptcy, which shattered more than the illusion of its own 
creditworthiness, were wide ranging. In particular, the loss of a major trader that had been 
perceived as investment grade—albeit barely—proved an object lesson in the importance of 
creditworthiness in financial markets. More immediately, the weak credit standing of many of the 
remaining energy trading companies now became apparent. The result was a collapse of volume in 
natural gas and, to a far greater extent, power derivatives markets.  Jens Weinmann 
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Since then, trading has regained importance. In 2003, for example, ISDA and the Edison Electric 
Institute (EEI) joined forces to formulate a North American Power Annex to the ISDA Master 
Agreement Schedule: ‘The Annex was developed to enable market participants to enter into physical 
power purchases and sales as well as financial derivative transactions under one agreement. It is 
structured to be consistent with EEI documentation already in use in the North American power 
market and will offer a new method for documenting power transactions under the ISDA Master 
Agreement.’ (EEI 2003) 
Efforts of standardisation are also undertaken in European electricity trading. In contrast to the 
USA, trading in the EU did not experience the traumatic consequences of the Enron debacle. Traders 
in the EU are often backed by powerful parent companies, and their opinions are heard and positions 
are integrated in the process of establishing a common architecture. Apart from the general urge to 
fully unbundle transmission and generation activities of the incumbent utilities to create a level 
playing field without discrimination against new players, traders also lobby in the decision how to 
regulate cross-border transmission and under which mechanism to allocate capacities, especially in 
congested lines. EFET, the European Federation of Energy Traders, has issued a series of position 
papers and is actively involved in the negotiations on the European level. EFET’s positions of course 
reflect a strive for greater trading opportunities. In the case of transmission capacity, EFET favours 
explicit auctions and split markets as opposed to a coordinated pricing mechanism on a regional or European 
level based on implicit auctions, which is considered economically more efficient by many scholars
7: 
It is highly unlikely that the EU will—or indeed should—adopt a common market design for all 
elements of trading arrangements, even across the UCTE [Union for the Coordination of 
Transmission of Electricity area]. It would be difficult, potentially impossible, to reach agreement 
on the precise details of such a market and national TSOs are likely to want to retain some direct 
control over local rules […] Neither is it necessarily desirable to adopt such a design, since the 
economic characteristics of different markets—in terms of fuel mix and plant dynamics—may lead 
to differences in the ‘optimal’ dividing point between unrestricted competition and the point at 
which TSOs should take over to balance the system and manage constraints.(EFET 2005b: 2)  
The traders conclude: ‘Faced with these difficulties, EFET believes that the key to integrating EU 
markets successfully is not to prescribe a uniform solution, but to maximise the opportunities for the 
‘market to work’ by moving to dynamic, flexible, continuous and inclusive trading arrangements.’ (ibid.) 
Nevertheless, the coordination of trading schedules and standardised trading arrangements are one 
of the major concerns of the traders. In the same position paper, EFET comments (2005b: 1): ‘One of 
the key barriers to realising this single market vision is the lack of harmonisation and integration 
between the practical operation of different national markets. Across the EU, market participants face 
radically different market structures and rules, radically different timetables for the ‘trading day’, 
different and frequently onerous balancing arrangements, and a plethora of IT platforms for trading 
and scheduling.’ As a remedy, EFET has developed a set of standardised contracts for energy traders, 
which are now in use over most of the EU’s connected power grid and are often referred to as ‘EFET 
contracts.’ The organisation also considers supplementing its contracts with a physical commodity 
type agreement ‘that could be used to trade numerous different wholesale physical commodities and 
products.’ (EFET 2005c: 38) EFET is equally active in business process standardisation by 
harmonising payment dates to facilitate cross-commodity payment netting and cross currency netting, 
and by developing software tools for electronic deal confirmation matching. 
Proposition 7: While merchant generators generally support regulatory convergence, electricity 
traders favour market designs that maximise trading opportunities. They actively contribute to 
convergence by the standardisation of trading contracts, data exchange and business processes. 
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IV.C Merchant Generators of Renewable Energy 
Independent producers of renewable energy have a very specific agenda in market design 
convergence. Many renewable energy sources and technologies are not yet commercially viable, 
which is, according to the proponents of the technologies, mainly induced by the fact that negative 
side-effects of power generation like global climate change or local pollution are not yet monetarily 
added to the costs: ‘If externalities were incorporated in the current market prices, the perceived cost 
of renewable energy would be practically unchanged, whereas the perceived low cost of conventional 
technologies based on fuel cycles would increase dramatically with the incorporation of their external 
costs.’ (EWEA 2005: 15) Accordingly, the political will to promote renewable energies has to be 
translated into subsidisation schemes and mechanisms beyond pure market forces. Implementation 
tools vary across countries and states in the EU and the US, and the respective approaches towards 
regulatory convergence follow different strategies. We will first discuss the EU and then compare it 
with the USA. 
A diverse range of measures, including investment-based tax incentives, soft loans, ‘green’ 
certificates and pre-specified feed-in tariffs, has been implemented in individual European countries, 
following the old scheme of national energy policies rather than an integrated, EU-wide approach. 
Denmark, for example, has not only introduced fixed premium prices for wind power and biomass, but 
has already started in the mid-1970s to actively promote R&D in wind turbine technology. From 1999 
onwards, Germany followed a strategy of distributing favourable loans for photovoltaic panels in the 
so-called 100,000-roofs programme. In addition, with the new millennium the government 
implemented a law that secures feed-in tariffs for different kinds of renewables.  
With its European Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity from renewable energy, 
member states accepted (non-binding) targets on the share of renewables in the overall electricity 
supply. Although the initiative of the European Renewables Directive was welcomed by marketers of 
renewables, the European Wind Energy Association—the interest group of the most promising and 
fast expanding new renewables industry—remains cautious of shifting the responsibility for promoting 
renewables away from the nation states: ‘Any change towards an EU-wide system at present would 
stall the development of renewable policies in many Member States by at least another 2-3 years—at a 
critical time for the technologies. The present efforts of Member States would be wasted and such a 
move could have devastating effects on national markets where signs of activity are at last beginning 
to show.’ (2005: 73) In particular, interconnection regulations for wind power differ according to 
country grid codes and the voltage level at the point of coupling between power producer and 
transmission infrastructure: ‘The great variety of national regulations is not always an advantage for 
wind turbine manufacturers. However, a Europe-wide harmonisation of interconnection regulations 
designed for high penetration situations is also not yet desirable, because some requirements pose an 
unduly heavy impact on wind turbine design and cost, and hence on the investors and operators of 
wind farms.’ (2005: 75) Ultimately, pan-European regulation could erode the benefits and special 
treatments that lobbying groups have tediously but successfully cumulated over the years in a number 
of countries, and a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of renewables treatment could be the consequence.  
Proposition 8: European marketers of renewable energy have an interest in preserving national 
regulations with country-specific instruments to promote renewables, instead of establishing joint 
regulation. 
The situation in the USA differs largely from the European experience. Although the US Senate 
voted in favour of a nationwide Renewable Portfolio Standard, requiring all utilities under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to generate at least 10% of their 
electricity from renewable energy sources by 2020, the proposal was eventually rejected by the 
Congress in its 2005 Energy Bill. However, on the state level, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
have become the preferred regulatory option to promote renewables in the US. In 2006, 22 states and 
the District of Columbia have implemented some form of RPS. Depending on individual state 
legislation, they determine both time and amount of the increase of certified renewable energies in the Jens Weinmann 
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supply mix, ranging from fixed targets, like Minnesota with at least 1250 MW by 2013, to California 
with a renewables supply of 33% in 2020 (Rabe 2006: 5). RPS can have very different design features. 
More market-oriented models with renewable energy credits (RECs) that can be sold and bought are 
implemented in the New England states, while some Western states, like Nevada and New Mexico, 
follow a more traditional single-buyer approach with utilities obliged to buy renewable energies on 
long-term contracts. A multitude of differences between individual RPS exist, mainly concerning the 
geographic eligibility (in-state or regional) and the resource eligibility (which renewables qualify for 
the standards).  
However, one of the most striking features of Renewable Portfolio Standards is that they have 
spread across the whole spectrum of electricity market designs, from states that still stick to the old 
monopoly model to states that have established competitive wholesale markets. Irrespective of the 
status of regulatory reforms in the different states, a development parallel to the stagnating 
deregulation efforts and the expansion of regional markets has emerged, leading to some regulatory 
convergence in the niche of renewable energies by policy diffusion and emulation beyond purely 
radial expansion, with some states being the ‘policy laboratory’ for successful practices that are 
modelled in states that are not necessarily geographically adjacent to the pioneers. Given the Bush 
administration’s long resilience against climate change policies, Rabe (2006: 1) detects an 
‘unexpectedly high level of state government engagement in developing policies to reduce greenhouse 
gases’ and even postulates a ‘race to the top’ in US American renewable portfolio standards. 
Peripheral federal organisations like the Environmental Protection Agency’s Combined Heat and 
Power Partnership (CHP) support the standardisation of mechanisms by releasing best practices guides 
for the implementation of renewable portfolio standards (see e.g. CHP 2005). 
The manufacturers and service providers dealing with renewable energies play an active role in 
pushing for a convergence of rules across states. In particular, the legitimacy and credibility of 
markets for emissions credits and renewable energy credits, also known as tradable renewable 
certificates (TRCs), or green tags is enhanced by inter-state initiatives like the Green-e Renewable 
Electricity Certification Programme, which sets up criteria for REC eligibility of renewable resources. 
Its governance board is advised by representatives of marketers of Green-e certified or REC products, 
a committee of utilities that offer Green-e certified products, and a number of stakeholders like 
environmental groups, consumer protection advocates and policy makers. Green-e sets up a standard 
that allows certified electricity to be transmitted and accredited not only within the defined area of an 
independent system operator (ISO), a Regional Transmission Organisation (RTO) or a Balancing 
Authority Area, but also to an adjacent ISO or RTO or Balancing Authority Area region, or even from 
and to Canada under a compatible Canadian certification scheme. 
Proposition 9: In coalition with state lawmakers, some federal agencies, consumer and 
environmental advocacy groups, US marketers of renewable energy pursue a strategy of regulatory 
convergence based on Renewable Portfolio Standards and Tradable Renewable Certificates, 
irrespective of other market design features. 
IV.D Large Industrial Users 
Large industrial users were among the first and most outspoken supporters of electricity market 
liberalisation—both in the high-price states of the US as well as in Europe—, for the expected 
benefits, in particular the direct access to wholesale markets, would increase their bargaining power 
towards suppliers and allow for substantial cost-savings. In Europe, this theory still holds: IFIEC 
Europe, the European branch of the International Federation of Industrial Energy Users, pushes for 
greater integration and for limiting market shares of generators (IFIEC 2005: 2):  
Today, IFIEC Europe does not consider the EU to be the relevant market yet; in most cases, 
relevant markets are, in effect, still the national ones. Therefore, IFIEC Europe invites EU Member 
states to establish similar rules and measures for their national electricity markets in order to limit 
market power using an appropriate threshold for generation capacity […] As long as markets are Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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not integrated EU-wide competition is blocked with the effect that regional and national markets 
are more easily dominated by the large generators. Within a European market crossborder trading 
needs to be as feasible as within today’s constricted areas. We need the same economic procedures 
to buy and sell electricity across borders as they exist today in most national markets. 
 The organisation encourages efforts by the European Commission to establish an internal energy 
market: ‘IFIEC Europe supports fully the Commission’s objective of pan-EU gas and electricity grids, 
but this is a long way from reality […] The Commission clearly recognises that the infrastructure 
development needed presents a long term challenge if the Directive’s objectives are to be met. IFIEC 
Europe agrees with this assessment and strongly supports initiatives leading to a more effective 
arrangements and preferably, ownership unbundling.’ (IFIEC 2006: 2) Hence, the major concern of 
large industrial users is the strategic use of generators’ local market power, which may be alleviated 
by cross-border interconnections and ‘more efficient,’ i.e. harmonised trading opportunities, which 
mainly corresponds to the European Commission’s judgment. 
On the national level, large industrial customers may prefer specific solutions diverging from the 
competition paradigm, though, when it is favourable to their business interests. For example, large 
industrial users of electricity in Spain have been eligible to sign so-called ‘interruptibility contracts’, 
which allows for discounts on their (regulated) electricity price if they are willing to get their 
electricity cut off in moments of demand-supply imbalances. Fraser and Van Siclen (1999) comment 
in a joint OECD/IEA report: ‘As there is substantial surplus of supply in Spain, most large consumers 
have been willing to accept this discount.’ In addition, they have been exempted from paying 
additional costs associated with independent power production if they purchase their power on the 
market, a privilege named ‘special regime.’ (ibid.) The ‘interruptibility contracts’ have not been 
abolished since liberalisation, but were actually renegotiated in 2006. AEGE, the Spanish association 
of large consumer of energy, considers it an essential tool to integrate effective demand-side 
management into the dispatch, given that 600 MW can be cut instantaneously for a short period of 
time, and a total of 3,500 MW can be interrupted for longer periods, albeit with previous 
announcements. The association asserts: ‘The most vulnerable clients [in the electricity market] are the 
energy-intensive companies manufacturing products that are exposed to global competition […] Since 
20 years, Spain is pioneering very powerful demand side management with low tariffs. Thanks to 
those instruments, the Spanish primary industry has been able to compete with its Central European 
colleagues after Spain’s integration into the Common Market.’
8 (AEGE 2006: 29) Perez-Arriaga 
(2005: 94) criticises: ‘The problem of this type of mechanisms [apart from the Interruptibility 
Contracts, Perez-Arriaga also refers to special night tariffs for residential consumers] is that they do 
not reflect the real system prices, but an approximation undertaken ex-ante by the regulator without a 
coherent methodology of calculation.’
9  
In the USA, the national association for large industrial users of electricity (Elcon) ‘was the earliest 
advocate for competition. In the mid-80’s Elcon saw the benefits of large, seamless, nondiscriminatory 
electricity markets with standard rules for all consumers. We [i.e. Elcon] believed then—and still 
believe now—that ‘real’ competition would discipline artificially high prices that came from 
regulation.’ (Anderson 2006b: 4) However, any congruence about the future direction of regulation in 
electricity markets between FERC and Elcon does not exist. In particular, Elcon’s position towards the 
most successful market model
10, the PJM ‘organised market’ with nodal pricing and some form of 
capacity payments, representing to a large extent FERC’s standard market design, provokes fierce 
                                                      
8   The original text is as follows: ‘Los clientes más vulnerables son las empresas intensivas en energía fabricantes de 
productos sometidos a competencia global [...] España, sin embargo, es pionera, desde hade 20 años, en señales de 
gestión de demanda muy potentes, pero bajo tarifa. Gracias a esas medidas de gestión, la industria básica española ha 
podido competir con sus colegas centroeuropeos tras nuestra incorporación al Mercado común.’ 
9   The original text is as follows: ‘El problema de este tipo de mecanismos es que no reflejan los precios reales del sistema, 
sino una aproximación realizada ex-ante por el regulador sin una metodología coherente del cálculo.’ 
10  Elcon’s critique has already been presented in section III.D on FERC’s attempt to implement a standard market design. Jens Weinmann 
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opposition. The Executive Director of Elcon asserts that ‘today’s “market” conditions are worse than 
traditional regulation, and that today’s “market” structure is not sustainable.’ (Anderson 2006a: 3) 
Elcon addresses a number of—what they consider—‘design flaws,’ including price caps and nodal 
pricing. The organisation’s concern is that effective competition can only be induced by a different 
market design. In respect to price caps, they state: ‘True competition requires that prices must not be 
administratively capped or mitigated […] such actions reduce the market incentives that would assure 
resource adequacy.’ (Anderson 2006b: 3) Nodal pricing and financial transmission rights are equally 
counterproductive, according to the organisation:  
While advocates of the LMP pricing scheme asserted that the LMP prices would ‘incent’ the 
construction of new generation or transmission to mitigate the constraints, the facts simply do not 
support such assertions. Nodal pricing actually creates a greater DISINCENTIVE to build, and 
today’s ‘financial transmission rights’ (FTRs) in place of physical transmission rights simply do 
not protect consumers from the very significant congestion costs of the transmission constraints. 
[capital letters in the original] (Anderson 2006b: 14) 
While industrial users and the European Commission agree on the core design of a future 
integrated market in the EU, the fundamental opposition of industry groups in the USA against 
‘organised markets’ following FERC’s standard market design shows that a broadly accepted 
regulatory design has not yet emerged.  
Proposition 10: Large industrial users do not support regulatory convergence if they believe that 
the predominant market design is suboptimal or if they fear losing country-specific privileges. 
IV.E Environmental NGOs and Consumer Advocacy Groups 
Non-governmental organisations, and in particular environmental protection and consumer advocacy 
groups, have become important players in the political landscape (Boli and Thomas 1997, Paterson 
1999). In municipal, national, regional and international decision processes they serve as watchdogs, 
advisers, lobbyists, and increasingly institutionalised intermediaries between the polity and its voting 
base. With the rise of the internet, local campaigns can now have global repercussions, and especially 
the environmentalist community takes advantage of the non-hierarchical immediacy of the diffusion of 
information to attract worldwide attention for their causes.  
In the EU, NGOs have long realised that an increasing number of decisions with a major economic, 
social and environmental impact has shifted from the member states to Brussels. Simmonds (2005: 28) 
estimates that around 700 interest groups are actively lobbying in EU matters, with the bulk of them 
representing business (70%). The remainder is split between the professions (10%) and public interest 
groups (20%). Of those, trade unions, environmentalists, consumer advocacy groups and other interest 
groups account for approximately 3%. The EU has chosen a formal consultation process to integrate 
particular interests into their often complex procedures. For energy matters, the European Energy and 
Transport Forum serves as a platform to express opinions. The Forum regularly assembles 
representatives of various backgrounds, including industry lobbying groups like the Asociación 
Española de la Industria Eléctrica (UNESA), the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) or the 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA). It furthermore provides a platform for people like the 
vice-president of the European Federation of Regional Energy and Environment Agencies, the 
president of the European branch of the international federation of industrial energy users (IFIEC) or 
the chief advisor of the European Alliance of Companies for Energy Efficiency in Buildings (EURO-
ACE). Apart from some academics and members of think-tanks, the unions also send several envoyés, 
like a representative of the German industry union for mining, chemistry and energy (IGBCE). The 
Forum publishes its opinions on a frequent basis or related to special events. For example, after the 
blackouts in North America and Italy it issued an opinion paper on the role of electricity transmission 
system operators and how to strengthen the security of supply in late 2003 (European Energy and 
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However, the composition of interest group representatives and the form of joint statements may 
have disadvantages regarding the unbiased attention towards the diversity of opinions within the EU. 
In the case of the role of the EU at the World Summit for Sustainable Development, key 
environmental NGOs criticised that ‘the EU Sustainability Strategy initiative is a case study in terms 
of how not to do public participation. The time period allowed for public comment on the Consultation 
Paper was far too short to ensure meaningful debate and input.’ (Bernstein 2001: 5) In addition, the 
NGOs claim that ‘while multi-stakeholder processes are useful in their own right, it is imperative that 
civil society organizations have the opportunity to formulate their own positions without the pressure 
of having to reach consensus based results with other stakeholders with whom they may not share a 
community of interests.’ (ibid.)  
Energie-Cités, an organisation comprising 140 members, mainly municipalities, but also inter-
municipal structures, local energy management agencies, municipal companies and groups of 
municipalities extending over 24 European countries, is equally sceptical about the EU decision-
making process. In their ‘Heidelberg Declaration,’ Energie-Cités’ Board of Directors expresses full 
support for the European Commission’s ‘Intelligent Energy’ approach in areas like buildings, 
renewable energy sources, cogeneration, or product eco-design. The board quotes the conclusions of 
the Report on the debate of the EU’s Green Paper, which claims that ‘local and regional authorities 
have a pivotal role to play, because they are close to actual situations and local actors and have a 
significant influence on final energy consumption through the decisions they make.’ (Energie-Cités 
2006) However, the board states, ‘in reality, the role left to local and regional authorities within the 
Community thought process and proposals remains marginal, despite some recent progress.’ Similarly, 
the Federation of German Consumer Organisations (VZBV), an NGO acting as an umbrella for 39 
German consumer associations, responds to a public EU consultation on how the EU carries out 
consultations on internal market policy (VZBV 2006: 5): ‘The VZBV has the impression that 
especially at conferences, where access is restricted, there is an imbalance between industry and 
consumer/NGO participation. The VZBV therefore calls upon the Commission to ensure that the 
whole spectrum of stakeholders participates at conferences.’ 
In respect to the delegation of regulatory powers to expert agencies and the rise of informal 
regulatory networks determining the details of the internal electricity market, Byrne and Mun (2003: 
60) see a potential danger:  
The process of establishing regulatory agencies or other kinds of controlling bodies needed for 
liberalised electricity markets has tended to date to reinforce the authority of centralised and 
largely autonomous organisations. These include power exchanges, independent system operators, 
and regional transmission organisations, all of which diminish the range of local decision-making 
and governance […] Partly because of the complexity involved in adequate management of 
liberalised electricity systems, technical knowledge tends to be further empowered at the cost of 
citizen-based political deliberations. 
The authors claim: ‘Without explicit efforts to reinsert democratic principles in the process of 
power liberalisation, electricity markets are likely to be controlled by and serve the interests of already 
powerful economic and technical entities.’ (ibid.) Eberlein and Grande (2005: 106) agree: 
‘Informalization, as we know, privileges ‘decision-relevant’ or ‘blockage-capable’ interests, while 
excluding others. Access to informal decision-making bodies like the transnational regulatory 
networks we have studied is necessarily selective, and it is not subject to any classical democratic 
control […] From the viewpoint of democratic legitimacy, informal forms of governance must 
accordingly be regarded as dubious.’  
Non-governmental organisations claim that the EU’s focus on competition in the internal energy 
market hampers the other two objectives of sustainability and security of supply, which were in the 
identified in the European Commission’s 2006 ‘Green Paper for a European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy’ (European Commission 2006). In particular, the Green Paper ‘does 
miss the chance to put energy efficiency into the center of the EU’s energy policies’ and fails to Jens Weinmann 
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suggest mandatory targets for renewable energy sources (Rocholl et al. 2006: 8). Further NGO claims 
not (yet) implemented in the internal electricity market include a full information disclosure regarding 
the environmental impact, the percentage contribution of each energy source to the commercial fuel 
mix, and the disclosure of the overall fuel mix of an electricity supplier. Although the EU has set up 
procedures to integrate suggestions from various stakeholder and lobbying organisations, it can be 
assumed that consensus on the actual market design could be achieved less easily and convergence 
would be delayed if environmental NGOs and consumer advocacy groups were more broadly included 
in the negotiation process. 
Proposition 11: The selective structure of European NGO and consumer advocacy group 
participation in market design decisions fosters transnational harmonisation and convergence. 
While in the EU’s top down approach to electricity sector liberalisation environmental NGOs and 
consumer advocacy groups have expressed doubts about the participatory openness in the ‘opaque’ 
EU decision-making process (Anderson et al. 2005: 24), the situation in the USA is fairly different. 
The lack of FERC’s authority to impose a standard market design has left possibilities for NGOs to 
influence the outcome of regime change. A typical case for the influence of NGOs was the 
restructuring process in the US state Oregon. Enron, one of the most influential proponents of 
deregulation, tried to achieve the implementation of a market architecture close to its own business 
interests: ‘The conflict over competitive markets reached a crescendo when power-marketer Enron 
purchased Portland General Electric, Oregon’s biggest utility, and used it as a stage to promote a 
radical deregulation proposal. Enron filed its proposal with the PUC, promising to create retail 
competition for all customers by forcing them by law away from the utilities into the laps of non-
utility suppliers.’ (Eisdorfer 2002: 26) However, widespread opposition arose. A representative of the 
NW Energy Coalition, an alliance of more than 100 environmental, civic and human service 
organizations, and businesses in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Alaska and British Columbia, 
describes the strategy as follows:  
The solution was not to break down into environmental, consumer and low-income constituency 
groups but to come together in one grand public interest coalition: the Fair and Clean Energy 
Coalition. We ultimately had more than 100 organizations join the coalition […] senior groups, 
faith groups, neighborhood groups in addition to the usual consumer and environmental energy 
suspects. We defeated the Enron plan at the PUC [public utilities commission] and took the fight 
to the legislature […]. And, most importantly, we won. (Jenks 2005) 
The final design retained a number of features, including a regulated system for retail customers, 
special features to promote renewable energies and energy efficiency, and a charge imposed on large 
industrial customers ‘for the unpaid portion of assets created to serve their needs before deregulation.’ 
(ibid.) The representative of the Citizens’ Utility Board contends: ‘Oregon has designed an electricity-
restructuring law that uniquely addresses major technological, policy, and economic changes in the 
industry without surrendering to the pressure to deregulate completely, as so many other states have 
done.’ (Eisdorfer 2002: 27) 
Another example for successful NGO action in the USA is the Cape Light Compact initiative for 
electric aggregation in Massachusetts. As early as 1993/94, organisations, businesses and interested 
individuals from the Cape Cod area developed the Barnstable County Energy Management Plan. One 
of its objectives was to explore legal ways how to aggregate demand on the municipal level and to 
organise a ‘competitive franchise’ scheme. In 1997, a formal proposal was set up, and after town 
meetings and town council votes, the ‘Cape Light Compact’ was founded in 1998 as an inter-
governmental organisation of all 21 Cape Cod and Martha’s Vineyard towns and Barnstable and Duke 
counties, comprising 187,000 individual consumers. However, several legal hurdles and the 
intervention of power generators on grounds of anti-competitive mechanisms prevented the Compact 
to become operational before 2002. In particular, electric companies Duke and Dominion raised 
concerns that the ‘opt-out’ rule for individual consumers provided a competitive advantage for the Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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chosen supplier ‘at the expense of consumer choice.’
11 (DTE 2001: 4) The legal battle was eventually 
won by the Compact. Bacon (2001) writes: ‘Their [the participating municipalities’] experience was 
instrumental in winning the inclusion of an ‘opt out’ provision in Massachusetts electrical deregulation 
law, called ‘community choice.’’ In 2002, the Compact not only started serving around 45,000 
customers in the area, but it also established a regional energy efficiency programme and several 
voluntary green tariffs promoting the construction of new renewable capacity in the area. Despite its 
long preparation time and initial difficulties, the concept of community choice aggregation was 
adopted by other states in the US: ‘This [the Compact rules] provided a successful model for other 
communities where market conditions were more favourable. A group of 95 communities in 
Northeastern Ohio for instance secured a contract for 350,000 residential consumers in early 2001 
working with the same industry professionals who work for the Compact.’ (Energie-Cités 2003: 3) 
Proposition 12: In the USA, NGOs and consumer advocacy groups use the states’ regulatory 
discretion to foster market designs that are adapted to local preferences. 
V. Epistemic Communities 
The reactions from interest groups and stakeholders of the electricity industry exhibit a remarkable 
range of attitudes towards regulatory convergence. However, all positions have in common that they 
tend, almost by definition, to represent the financially motivated interests of their constituencies, be it 
in accordance with the top-down suggested market design or in opposition to regulatory convergence. 
In contrast, academia and the world of scholarly investigation bear, at least theoretically, the privilege 
of  a priori neutrality and a positivist thrive towards economic optimality, reached by deliberate 
theorising and open discourse. Since Kuhn’s (1962) introduction of the human element in scientific 
paradigm change, the latently unbiased stance of academia has been under scrutiny, though, and in a 
context of postmodern eclecticism the academic community is not immune against fragmentation and 
partisanship for one concept or another.  
Haas (1992) developed the idea of an epistemic community as a ‘network of professionals with 
recognised expertise in a particular area and an authoritative claim as a source of policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area.’ Epistemic communities have evolved in the process of 
professionalisation and specialisation of knowledge: ‘The growing technical uncertainties and 
complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy co-ordination not only 
necessary but also increasingly difficult […] The expansion and professionalisation of bureaucracies 
and the growing technical nature of problems have fostered an increase in the deference paid to 
technical expertise, and in particular, to that of scientists.’ (1992: 3 and 11) According to Haas (1992: 
3), epistemic communities share the same set of normative principles and beliefs. Furthermore, their 
logic follows similar causalities, and they apply the same techniques of evaluating knowledge in their 
domain of expertise. They also pursue resembling practices in terms of influencing policy outcomes, a 
feature that Haas calls ‘policy enterprise.’ 
One epistemic community played an important role in liberalisation policies: the ‘Chicago Boys,’ a 
group of academics trained at the University of Chicago and convinced of the superiority of free-
market principles over state control. They influenced the politics of Ronald Reagan in the USA and 
Margaret Thatcher in the UK, but also spread their neo-liberal economic views either directly or 
indirectly via international lending organisations into many countries. Especially the World Bank and 
the IMF relied in their loan policies on principles developed by the Chicago Boys; the organisations’ 
agenda got a fairly polarised reception under the name of ‘Washington Consensus,’ referring to a joint 
position of academics, the federal government and the international lending organisations (Williamson 
2000, Naim 1999). Kogut and MacPherson (2004) test the impact of both IMF loans as well as the 
                                                      
11  The opt-out rule automatically includes all customers in the municipality in the scheme, as opposed to the opt-in rule that 
requires customers to explicitly state that they want to participate in the programme. Jens Weinmann 
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(physical) presence of Chicago-trained economists on the likelihood of privatisation policies across 93 
countries between 1980 and 1997. In concordance with a number of other studies, they do not find 
statistical evidence that economic crises on their own caused the spread of neo-liberal policies. They 
rather detect the effect of an epistemic community among scholars of economics: ‘It is not the 
economic profession in general, but a particular breed of economic ideology [as diffused by Chicago-
trained economists] that appears to be consequential for explaining the rapidity by which an economic 
policy is adopted. This finding is an unusual demonstration that ideas are consequential even if the 
leading academic protagonists are not holding directly positions of power.’ (2004: 30)  
Electricity sector reforms require a highly specialised expertise because of the unique 
characteristics of the power flow, the non-storability of electricity, the need for instantaneous match 
between supply and demand, and the different generation technologies. Before liberalisation the 
decision space has predominantly been the domain of engineers, who developed optimisation 
algorithms for dispatch and long-term capacity planning. Since the introduction of competitive 
elements, though, an increasing number of economists and lawyers have entered the field, with their 
subject-specific thought and decision patterns based on a different iterative logic and rationale. Rather 
than justifying and preserving the rate-of-return status quo, the intellectual challenge to create markets 
for a service that has for a long time been considered a natural monopoly attracts scientists across the 
disciplines. An academic participating in the European process of liberalisation describes the 
motivation for a joint policy enterprise
12: ‘The basic attitude of economists is generally in favour of 
competitive markets; engineers worked towards developing the technical feasibility of unbundling the 
networks while maintaining security; political scientists saw a new stage in the fascinating progress of 
Europe, and legal experts were pleased with facing the challenge of developing a new legal system 
and finding ways through innumerable obstacles.’  
Communication between experts becomes crucial in the transmission and exchange of ideas, and 
epistemic communities have been forming across the globe. At the same time, politicians need 
informed advice, because the complexity of the sector prevents them from acquiring knowledge of all 
the details of electricity supply, and seek legitimacy and reputation by relying on external, preferably 
academic (i.e., ‘unbiased’) competences.  
A number of academic clusters have formed to do research on regulation in liberalised electricity 
markets, including the University of California Energy Institute in Berkeley, the Carnegie Mellon 
Electricity Industry Center, the University of Cambridge-MIT energy and environment co-operation, 
CERNA, the Centre for Industrial Economics at the Ecole des Mines in Paris, which provides input for 
SESSA, the Sustainable Energy Specific Support Assessment (SESSA) of the EU, or the Institute for 
Technological Research at the Universidad Pontificia Comillas in Madrid. Of all the active clusters, 
two groups that have been designed to bring together academics, regulators, business executives and 
politicians will be analysed in more detail
13: the Florence School of Regulation in Europe and the 
Harvard Electricity Policy Group in the USA. They both organise several workshops and conferences 
per year, tackling all topics of electricity market reforms, from the treatment of reactive powers in 
secondary markets to the role of power exchanges in cross-country integration, and are primarily 
financed by stakeholders of the energy industry.  
The Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG), which exists since 1993, is jointly directed by an 
economist of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and by a lawyer and former commissioner of 
the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. As stated in its 2004 information brochure (HEPG 2004), 
one of its objectives is ‘to address key problems related to the transition to a more competitive 
                                                      
12  Interview in January 2007, interviewee remains anonymous. 
13  All academic clusters and networks of professionals occupy different niches in the regulatory process, some of them 
more technical or simulation oriented, others more focussed on advancing and adapting economic theory to the dynamics 
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electricity market.’ [italics added] HEPG’s research director has been instrumental in developing 
design features of the most successful US American electricity markets, including the methodology for 
locational marginal pricing and financial transmission rights. He has academically transformed 
FERC’s standard market design into what he calls ‘Successful Market Design’: ‘SMD [i.e., Successful 
Market Design] is necessary. There is no dichotomy for an open access model. There is no theory and 
no experience that identifies any viable alternative. There is no need to assume that SMD is the only 
model that works, the evidence makes the case.’ (Hogan 2005: 20) However, HEPG functions in a 
strictly non-partisan way and ‘takes no position on any issue and discussions focus on informing and 
analyzing, rather than necessarily forming a consensus.’ (HEPG Brochure) It is aimed at bringing 
together ‘electricity industry executives from public power and investor-owned utilities, independent 
power producers, consumer advocates, regulators, energy officials from both state and federal 
governments, representatives of the environmental and financial communities, and academics.’ (ibid.) 
The large range of participants includes representatives of public utilities commissions who oppose 
any liberalisation in their states, and members of organisations like APPA, the American Public Power 
Association. It can be assumed that HEPG’s role as a podium for finding best practices of system 
transformation in the heyday of US liberalisation during the second half of the 1990s had to be 
redefined given the lack of a common ‘policy enterprise,’ as it is the EU’s underlying agenda of 
European integration and its pragmatic manifestation, the internal market. HEPG meetings may now 
rather serve as a forum for informational exchange and informal dialogue, thereby reducing 
uncertainty about intentions and actions and creating a common, technology-focussed language among 
the agents involved in the sector.  
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) has been founded in 2003 as an initiative of the Council 
of European Energy Regulators (CEER) in association with the European Commission and has been 
integrated into the Robert Schuman Center for Applied Studies at the European University Institute 
(EUI)
14. The FSR’s mission is to create ‘a European forum where policy and business decisionmakers, 
regulators, regulated companies and academics from different countries who are involved in the 
energy sector can meet. Activities include the discussion of regulatory concepts, practices and 
policies; the dissemination of best practices; foreseeing new challenges and requirements and the 
development of a common regulatory language and regulatory culture, along with norms of 
accountability.’ (FSR 2006) The School provides a training course for European regulators, too, which 
attracts not only young professionals from the emerging and expanding European regulatory agencies, 
but also interested individuals from countries outside Europe, including North Africa and the Middle 
East. By the joint formation of evaluation principles and norms, and by the strong networking 
component of the meetings, the Florence School of Regulation contributes not only to a diffusion of 
ideas, but also to a cross-border collective regulatory culture. 
Proposition 13: Epistemic communities accelerate regulatory convergence by providing a platform 
for academic exchange, forming a common language between regulators, and channelling 
consensual knowledge to political and corporate decision-makers. 
VI. Structural Complexity and Path-Dependence 
The preceding sections of our analysis implicitly assume that systemic change is the result of a multi-
layered, political bargaining process and is assisted by the academic guidance of epistemic 
communities. Path-dependence introduces a new element into the equation: Regulatory convergence 
may be unlikely, because the existing institutional—i.e. legal, economic or cultural—conditions 
                                                      
14  The choice of location seems coherent, because the EUI is the downsized version of some of the EU’s original member 
states’ project to establish a European elite university. In its current form the EUI trains doctoral students in social 
sciences and invites postdoctoral students and professors for research, thereby creating a platform for intellectual 
exchange, policy-relevant research, and a formation of principled beliefs under the ‘policy enterprise’ of a politically, 
economically and somewhat culturally unified Europe. Jens Weinmann 
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impede the implementation of a specific design. Again, we examine closely the differences between 
the Europe and the USA in order to determine to what extent structural characteristics affect the 
dynamics of the process and whether they differ East and West of the Atlantic. 
Structures in the electricity sector are mostly the result of human agency transforming ideas into 
physical reality, like transmission lines, generation plants or a dispatch algorithm. But structures also 
encompass the linguistic, cultural and socio-economic traditions and institutions of countries, which 
might be less tacit but nonetheless responsible for collective routines and some systemic inertia that 
may be difficult to overcome. For example, EFET comments: ‘A significant barrier for network users 
across the European power network is that numerous network operators send communications only in 
their national language. This refers to the day-to-day communication as well as setting up the bilateral 
legal agreements between the two parties. This causes disadvantages for foreign network users but 
more importantly delays significantly the communication between both parties.’ (EFET 2005b: 6) 
Linguistic diversity is a fairly general, somewhat Babylonian difficulty of EU integration, while other 
structural features are unique to the electricity sector and can be found in both Europe and the USA. In 
the following two sections, we will specifically concentrate on barriers to convergence due to ‘seams’ issues 
and ownership structures/property rights in respect to vertical (re-)integration and preferential dispatch. 
VI.A Regional Integration and ‘Seams’ Issues 
The USA and the EU envisage the integration of electricity systems, which have evolved 
independently, into larger regional markets. Regulatory convergence relies on a harmonisation of rules and 
procedures that, given the complexity of the electricity supply, can be costly and difficult to implement. 
In the USA, the discourse circles around ‘seams’ issues: ‘A seams problem occurs when 
differences in business practices, market design, reliability rules, or software platforms between 
regions impede trade between the regions. When these seams problems prevent the economic 
exchange of energy, they increase transactions costs.’ (FERC 2002: 3) Numerous factors can create 
seams. The North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) collects complaints about seams 
issues from corporate players, categorises them, assigns priorities and identifies whether they are 
currently addressed by the RTOs. Some of the seams are based on the lack of coordination between 
regulators and can be removed if joint agreements are achieved. For example, the North American 
Energy Standards Board (NAESB 2003) reports of ‘pancaking’ between the North-Eastern markets, 
where transaction margins from one regional market to the next are of the same magnitude or less than 
the prevailing export charges, which removes incentives to transact business. Similarly, differences in 
definitions, requirements, deliverability and recall procedures in capacity markets have hampered the 
ability of suppliers to sell ICAPs (installed capacity) between Northeast independent system operators. 
Other seams issues are more technical and require joint IT systems. Between the New England, New 
York and PJM markets a company complains of transmission checkout failure, which means that 
operators curtail transactions due to mismatched tag data, different MW volumes, etc.: ‘The 
curtailment of transactions due to data incompatibility [is] disruptive to both the marketplace and the 
reliable operation of the grid.’ (NAESB 2004) Another problem is the lack of uniformity in scheduling 
requirements, like deadlines for reserving transmission services or energy bids into real-time markets 
between neighbouring power pools: ‘RTOs have different ramp rates and scheduling requirements that 
require market participants to complete multiple submissions for the same transaction.’ (ibid.) While 
some critics ‘express concern’ that FERC’s reliance on RTOs is counterproductive because the 
‘reversion on smaller markets [than on a standard market design] could perpetuate problems in moving 
electricity between markets’ and thus reinforce seams, others argue that ‘resolving this issue [the 
seams] is merely a question of political will. The real challenge seems to be bringing state regulators 
in line with the RTOs in setting good rules for the market place.’ (DeJong 2004: 22)  
Several initiatives have been established to coordinate action on seams between state regulators, 
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Interconnection (SSG-WI), which was founded in 2001 to address commercial issues at the boundaries 
between proposed RTOs in the Western states of the USA and to create a competitive and seamless 
West-wide wholesale electricity market. It is composed of representatives of the California 
Independent System Operator and the filing utilities of the proposed Grid West and WestConnect 
RTOs and has published several reports on transmission expansion. According to an assessment by the 
Western Governors’ Association (WGA) in consultation with the Committee on Regional Electric 
Power Cooperation (CREPC), the SSG-WI suffers from its status as an ad hoc group without a legal 
status, a ‘fragile institutional structure and inadequate funding.’ (WGA 2005: 8) In respect to seams 
issues like pancaking, non-uniform scheduling practices, proliferation of control areas and 
underutilization of transmission capacity, the report comments: ‘The West does not have in place 
effective institutions to devise regional solutions to these issues. In the absence of an interconnection-
wide institution(s) to deal with these issues it is increasingly likely that ‘solutions’ will be developed 
in national forums such as North American Energy Standards Board.’ (WGA 2005: 10) The authors 
express doubts about convergence based on national standards, though: ‘Because of physical 
differences and differences in how the Eastern and Western grids are operated, the solutions developed 
at the national level may or may not work in the Western Interconnection.’ (ibid.) 
A more successful track record of tackling seams issues can be found between the regional markets 
of the North-Eastern USA: New York, PJM and New England. A representative of the New York 
Independent System Operator counts 45 seams issues that have been resolved between 2000 and 2005, 
including similar emergency programs called under very similar system conditions with similar or 
identical price floors, or programs under which demand response can obtain ICAP credit by virtue of 
participation in an emergency/reliability program (Kelley 2005). The coordination is further enhanced 
by the creation of joint working groups and protocols, for example the Interregional Coordination and 
Seams Issue Resolution Agreement between New York and New England, or the NYISO and PJM 
Interregional Coordination Agreement.  
The structural complications of market integration in the US is paralleled by fairly similar problems 
in the fragmented national systems of the EU. For example, EFET (2005b: 5) remarks in respect to 
information technology:  
Most national market operators for electricity and gas have adopted IT solutions in isolation from 
each other. […] Widespread isolated IT development has hitherto often entailed market 
participants having to procure different IT solutions for each national market, interconnector 
and/or control area in each commodity. […] There are multiple protocols for data exchange 
between various providers of similar services (TSOs, exchanges etc.) across and indeed within 
each national market, involving implementation of many interfaces, a need for translation of 
messages between different implementations of the same protocol and in some cases parallel but 
overlapping IT infrastructures. 
Many scholars dealing with the creation of an internal European electricity market point to cross-
border interconnection and congestion management as a major challenge, which in the American 
context could be classified as seams issues. Glachant and Leveque (2005: 7) comment:  
Today, one of the strongest protectionist forces on the EU’s internal market is that congestion 
management is exclusively, or predominantly, domestic or based on domestic criteria. In practice, 
congestion at the ‘borders’ appears as the outcome of domestic decisions and priorities decreed 
separately in each Member State. There is no real comprehensive operational cooperation to 
minimise congestions at the borders or to maximise the capacity available at the interconnections. 
Economic inefficiencies at borders are not resolved very easily, given the strategies of some 
players and the heterogeneous structure of settlements. Implicit auctioning with nodal pricing, as it 
exists in some North-Eastern markets in the USA, would be—according to many scholars and 
practitioners—the preferred outcome, but ‘given that a full European nodal approach is currently some 
distance from political reality, could an incremental approach via regional market coupling be 
pursued?’ Brunekreeft, Neuhoff and Newbery (2004) ask. Market coupling would be an intermediate Jens Weinmann 
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step of overcoming technical and institutional hurdles in the implementation of a regional market. It 
suggests creating a joint dispatch between neighbouring markets, while integrating cross-border 
network constraints into the dispatch algorithm. According to a joint proposal of ETSO and EuroPEX 
(ETSO-EuroPEX 2005), it ‘avoids change to local procedures and arrangements, and supports local 
market variations,’ while having the capacity to evolve over time from small to larger country clusters. 
Although it needs some harmonisation of intraregional transmission modelling, data transfer, and 
publishing formats, it can be considered a transition to a more integrated model. The fact that 
EuroPEX, the Association of European Power Exchanges, and ETSO, the European Transmission 
System Operators, promote their flow-based market coupling model together (EuroPEX would be in 
charge of the market coupling, whereas ETSO would do the flow-based modelling) already indicates 
that there are business interests not only in favour of preserving national interconnection mechanisms, 
but also in favour of greater integration. In fact, market coupling between Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands has been actively pursued by the power exchanges and regulators in the respective countries. 
The role of technical agencies seems even more influential in seams issues than in other areas of 
regulation. Defining technical standards related to the grid may be a precursor for further convergence. 
The European group of transmission system operators, UCTE (Union for the Coordination of 
Transmission of Electricity), whose system extends from Lisbon to Warsaw and from Denmark to 
Greece and supplies around 450 million people, pushes for compliance with its standards by 
periodically modifying and releasing its Operation Handbook (OH). Until now, compliance with the 
rules is only secured by a private contract among the TSOs within UCTE, but, according to the wish of 
the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), it shall be complemented with an EU-wide 
legislation in the future. By their EU advisory body ERGEG, the regulators stress ‘the need to ensure 
the binding character of the ‘new’ rules, compliance monitoring and enforcement procedures.’ 
(ERGEG 2005: 1) 
The technical nature of many seams issues somewhat hides and underestimates the importance of 
the institutional embeddedness and the willingness of agents to cooperate in order to create seamless 
markets. While the US appears to be converging on seams issues in the organised markets in the 
North-East, driven by participants in the markets, federal agencies like the North American Energy 
Standards Board and the coordination between independent system operators and RTOs, the example 
of the failure to set up effective structures to deal with seams issues in the diverse regulatory 
environment of the Western US suggests that important drivers for harmonisation are the informal 
cooperation of regulatory agencies and lobbying efforts of stakeholders. In the USA and in Europe the 
creation of seamless markets faces less hurdles from technical incompatibilities than from strategies of 
organisational survival. 
Proposition 14: In areas with adequate institutional support, seams issues are gradually resolved 
through informal regulatory networks, stakeholder lobby initiatives and technical standardisation 
agencies. 
VI.B Property Rights 
The template of a restructured, competitive electricity system foresaw vertical unbundling between the 
industry’s segments of generation, transmission and distribution. Joskow (1996: 361) distinguishes 
between a structural separation through divestitures, a functional separation within existing vertically 
integrated firms, and a hybrid model that preserves integrated ownership but delegates operational 
control of the grid to an independent system operator. In addition, Joskow suggests that ‘the 
competitive segments, in particular generation, may have to be restructured horizontally through 
divestiture to create a generation market in which there is ‘enough’ competition so that horizontal 
market power is not a significant problem.’ (ibid.) Property rights are a fundamental impediment to 
effective segmentation of ownership; they are anchored in the very philosophy of capital as one of the 
pillars generating wealth and economic growth, and they guarantee protection against arbitrary 
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One of the major differences between national electricity sectors is the way how property rights are 
allocated: While in some countries—mostly in the industrialised world—private, entrepreneurial 
initiatives started to provide electricity as a bundled service to industrial and wealthy residential 
customers and then got complemented with municipal units like the German Stadtwerke to connect 
and supply the larger public under a universal service obligation, other countries—in particular in the 
developing world—saw central governments push for large-scale electrification as a core 
infrastructure service from the very beginning. Many systems underwent a phase of nationalisation in 
the middle of the 20
th century, either as a product of decolonisation, or as a consequence of Keynesian 
politics and a redefinition of infrastructure services in the welfare state. Paradoxically, state ownership 
has since facilitated the most common top-down induced transition towards the unbundled competitive 
design model, because it enables governments to reorganise property rights in the sector according to 
textbook IO (Industrial Organisation) theory. Restructuring the electricity sector in England & Wales, 
for example, was a fairly easy task for the UK government, because the Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB) was fully state-owned and state-controlled. Other countries have a more complex 
ownership structure, like Germany with more than 800 public or private entities that own assets in the 
sector, which makes restructuring a more discretionary and complex challenge, because a large 
number of decision-makers are actively involved in the process. However, ownership segmentation of 
the sector is not always an impediment to reform, as the Norwegian experience shows, while the fact 
of having just one large state-owned utility does not inevitably lead to an easy implementation of 
reforms, if the influence of traditionalist interest groups and a specific public service mentality prevail, 
as it is the case in France.  
In comparison with changes in legislative texts, which can be implemented at a fairly low level of 
transactionary friction, property rights exhibit stronger characteristics of path-dependence, for they are 
costly to modify and might be subject to sustained political resistance by stakeholders. The diverging 
types of ownership allocation induced different control models already in the pre-reform epoch of rate-
of-return regulation, especially concerning the interaction between the utilities and the respective 
public administration that determines appropriate tariff levels and coordinates integrated resource 
planning—federal or state-level ministries or agencies or municipal or district governing bodies. 
Instead of modifying the existing ownership structure to comply with the design template of a new, 
vertically unbundled market including a competitive generation segment, the high transaction costs of 
transformation may lead to the inverse constellation: a necessity of adapting the rules of the new 
regulatory regime to respond to the sector’s property patterns, thereby exacerbating the evolution of 
niche market designs that try to address country-specific institutional arrangements. Alternatively, it 
may result in a wave of ‘modelling’ and policy bandwagoning of successful non-template practices 
across countries. 
We will assess the likelihood of complications on the path to convergence in two dimensions. First, 
concerning the generation segment, different models have been implemented to mimic politically 
infeasible horizontal divestitures in the EU, whereas in the US a trend of preferential dispatch of 
generation subsidiaries of former utilities can be observed. Second, the functional and operational 
separation of transmission assets—falling short of full vertical unbundling—also leads to diverging 
design schemes.  
Ownership concentration in generation can be a decisive factor for frequent intervention by 
antitrust authorities and regulators. Newbery (2005: 21) addresses the issue: ‘Outside Nordel [the 
market in the Scandinavian countries], interconnection is typically inadequate to address country-level 
concentration, and absent these conditions for competition, the choice of market design is unlikely to 
adequately mitigate market power, although some designs may facilitate collusion more than others.’ 
Given that outright divestiture of the utilities is legally and/or politically not yet feasible in most 
member states (notable exceptions are England and Italy), the European countries’ regulatory agencies 
and the European Commission have chosen different models to deal with strategic behaviour of their 
incumbents. For example, Spain introduced a system of Competition Transition Charges (CTCs) Jens Weinmann 
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which are calculated as the difference between the tariff revenues and the costs of the regulated 
activities plus some subsidies for coal generation. They were initially intended as a compensation for 
the utilities’ stranded costs, but have the politically welcomed side-effect to create an incentive to keep 
prices below a threshold defined by the regulatory authority for each generator to receive a payment. 
The CTCs can be considered a form of contract for differences (Newbery 2005: 16) or an implied 
price cap (Fabra 2005: 48). The concept and the calculation of the CTCs have been a target of 
criticism from analysts, primarily for the lack of transparency and a fixed, exogenous baseline price 
corresponding to the marginal costs of a CCGT plant (Crampe and Fabra 2004: 8). One new market 
entrant in Spain has claimed that wholesale prices have been manipulated and are set below costs 
(Fabra 2005: 48). It is foreseeable that the Spanish CTC will be substituted by a different 
compensation scheme before its official end in 2010, with the options ranging from paying a lump-
sum to firms for the residual CTCs to some form of vesting contracts like in the UK (ibid.). The 
CTC’s implied price cap may be replaced by some other mechanism that limits the potential exercise 
of market power. One design element that would actually allow the Spanish market to operate with 
reduced market power but without modifying the current oligopolistic ownership structure has been 
suggested by Perez-Arriaga (2005): the introduction of virtual power plants.  
Virtual power plants (VPPs) have become the predominant design scheme to cope with horizontal 
market power in the EU. They are used as a merger remedy or address the dominant position of the 
incumbent. The first country that implemented VPPs was France in 2002, where the European 
Commission requested EdF to virtually divest 6,000 MW of its capacity as a precondition for 
acquiring a stake in the German utility EnBW. In 2003, the Belgian Competition Council followed the 
Commission and imposed a 1,200 MW virtual divestiture on Electrabel. One year later, the Dutch 
competition agency NMa forced Nuon to sell virtual 900 MW over five years because of its 
acquisition of Reliant Energy Europe, one of the major power generating companies in the 
Netherlands. Similarly, Danish, Italian and Czech regulatory authorities have imposed virtual 
divestitures. Two types of VPPs exist: ‘In Belgium, antitrust authorities oblige the incumbent to sell 
financial VPPs, while in the Netherlands the regulator has been discussing physical VPPs. The main 
difference between financial and physical VPPs is that a physical VPP is associated with a specific 
generation plant while a financial VPP is not.’ (Willems 2006: 3) Willems (ibid.) shows that virtual 
divestitures do not have the same effects as real divestitures, with financial divestitures being even less 
effective than physical divestitures. The European Commission and national regulators embrace the 
concept, though, as a behavioural rather than structural remedy for a structural phenomenon. Given the 
associated introduction of a range of different assignment protocols and auction proceedings that 
reflect the diversity of instruments available, virtual power plants can be considered to be an example 
of Braithwaite and Drahos’ concept of ‘modelling,’ in which a successful new policy model spreads 
across countries in slightly varied forms.  
Whereas Europe has embarked on virtual power plants as a second-best alternative to real 
divestitures, US regulators face a dilemma in respect to reintegration and preferential dispatch. 
Although generation assets owned by utilities decreased from almost 90% to 63% between 1995 and 
2005 (Johnston 2006 in the New York Times), some of the restructured utilities grant preferential 
dispatch to their divested generation companies. In other cases, parent companies still own both the 
utilities and the formerly integrated power producers: ‘Some regulators allowed utilities to favor the 
sister companies with long-term contracts even if they did not offer the best price for electricity.’ 
(ibid.) For example, Robert McCollough, a utility economist and consultant, writes (2006: 1): ‘In 
Maryland, regulated Baltimore Gas & Electric transferred its generation assets to Constellation, its 
unregulated parent. For the last five years, the state has conducted auctions where the bidders, the 
winners, and even the bidding process are hidden from public view […] The same supplier always 
wins the same auction to serve the same customers - albeit at greatly increased prices.’ In some states 
like Texas, companies have even been allowed to fully reintegrate their ailing generation subsidiaries 
back under the umbrella of the parent utility (New York Times 2006).  Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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As a reaction to these encountered forms of reintegration, FERC has strengthened its surveillance 
role under Section 203 of the Federal Power Act in 2005. In particular, it is now authorised to examine 
whether acquisitions may result in potential cross-subsidies between a public utility or an electric 
utility company and its non-utility associate like a power marketer or a generator without captive 
customers, while beforehand the Commission only had to determine that a proposed transaction would 
be ‘consistent with the public interest.’ (Hunton & Williams 2006: 4) This move is mirrored by greater 
vigilance of the state Public Utilities Commissions. For example, the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) approved Southern California Edison’s (SCE) acquisition of the 1054 MW 
Mountainview plant that was still under construction at the time of the deal; ‘at the same time, though, 
CPUC found ‘vexing weaknesses’ with the structure of SCE's proposed transaction. So the 
commission attached caveats to its approval to insulate ratepayers from some of the risks SCE 
proposes to undertake.’ (Burr 2004) The article, published in Public Utilities Fortnightly, comments: 
‘Such a give-and-take approach might allow regulators to approve individual transactions, while also 
addressing lingering concerns about competition and market power.’ (ibid.) 
The virtual power plant approach of European regulators as well as the greater vigilance—but not 
outright refusal—of acquisitions and practices leading to reintegration and horizontal market power in 
the US suggests that disputes settle at a less-than-optimal equilibrium of regulatory intervention. 
Theories of a perfectly competitive electricity market design would dictate more rigorous separation 
and divestiture, but the lack of political and societal bargaining power as well as the uncertainty about 
efficient market mechanisms for resource adequacy and reliability prevent regulators and politicians to 
push liberalisation further.  
Proposition 15: Regulators converge on second-best strategies to tackle vertical reintegration and 
horizontal property rights issues in the generation segment. 
Closely linked to the phenomenon of vertical reintegration is the question how to deal with 
transmission assets. In the economic-theory version of competitive electricity markets, they are the 
segment in the electricity system that most closely corresponds to a natural monopoly. As opposed to 
most undertakings in the US, transmission assets have been separated and put under public or 
(regulated) private control in a number of countries in Western Europe, for example in the UK’s 
pioneering England & Wales market. Economic theory has been even more influential in developing 
countries like Argentina or Colombia, where the impact of international financial organisations was 
greater and their vision of an ideal market could be more easily implemented than in most stubbornly 
incrementalist countries of the industrialised world.  
In its Directive 2003/54/EC, the European Commission requires all member states to functionally 
and legally unbundle transmission services from other activities of the utilities, thereby enhancing a 
process of structural convergence. Despite a considerable variety in the actual implementation of the 
directive—as at the end of 2005 an EU report (Gómez-Acebo and Russell 2005) documents that 7 out 
of 18 analysed member states had fully transposed it, 10 had partially transposed it, and only one 
country, Portugal, was lagging severely behind—the trend towards legal and functional unbundling 
within the EU establishes a single model of (somewhat incomplete) corporate separation. Problems 
with legal and functional unbundling have mainly occurred in respect to vertical foreclosure, 
especially in establishing a non-discriminatory access to the grid. In the EU, some transmission system 
operators (TSOs) have been suspected to erect barriers to entry if they are affiliated to an integrated 
company (Slingerland et al. 2006: 8). In its Sector Enquiry, the Competition Directorate General of the 
EU (European Commission 2006: 7) states: ‘The market structure suffers from a systemic conflicts of 
interest resulting from the vertical integration, in many cases, of the supply, transport and distribution 
level.’ The Commission criticises the slow progress in establishing a ‘level playing field’ and 
recommends that ‘further measures such as full structural unbundling (i.e. separation on the supply 
and retail business from monopoly infrastructures) should be considered.’ (ibid.) [bold characters in 
the original] While the Commission has successfully been delegating the task of a European-wide 
harmonisation of standards to informal regulatory networks, unbundling apparently necessitates the Jens Weinmann 
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political weight of a higher hierarchical level to be implemented by member states. The power of the 
Commission does not stretch into core property rights, though, which remain unaffected under the 
Unbundling Directive.  
In the USA, the transmission system remains to a large extent in the hands of private utilities. In 
1995, around 140 different control area operators, largely corresponding to vertically integrated 
utilities, were running the grid. Joskow (2004: 30) speaks of a ‘highly balkanized structure of 
ownership’ in the transmission sector, which would be difficult to overcome and consolidate in fewer 
control areas and horizontally integrated transmission companies spanning large geographic areas: ‘In 
a country that supports private property rights, it is very difficult to force private incumbent utilities to 
implement vertical and horizontal ownership restructuring initiatives of this kind.’ (Joskow 2004: 4) 
However, by implementing Order 2000 FERC encouraged the creation of Regional Transmission 
Organisations, which are responsible for managing the power flows across the previous control areas. 
Joskow criticises: ‘These independent entities [i.e. RTOs] own no transmission assets, have no 
linemen or helicopters to maintain transmission lines and respond to outages, and are not directly 
responsible for the costs of operating, investing in, or the ultimate performance of the transmission 
networks they ‘manage’.’ (2004: 30) However, since the advent of RTOs—to some extent modelled 
on the grid operators in the North-East US—an increasing number of utilities have transferred their 
operational control to RTOs. The case of AEP joining PJM has already been discussed. Especially 
smaller utilities are likely to ally with RTOs. For example, Allegheny Power, an investor-owned utility 
serving 1.5 million customers in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, and Virginia, provides 
several reasons why it decided to join PJM for the control of its transmission system, among others the 
possibility of getting involved in a robust energy market, utilising the experience of PJM across 
multiple reliability councils and control areas, and ‘meeting FERC and State Commission expectations 
in an expedited manner.’ (Pfirrmann 2002: 13)  
Both the EU and the US experience with vertical unbundling are characterised by the persistence of 
property rights of vertically integrated utilities, which leads—similar to preferential dispatch and the 
lack of horizontal divestiture in the generation segment—to a top-down push towards second-best 
solutions. While the European Commission is able to exert some direct leverage to implement 
functional and legal unbundling via its directives, the delegation of operational control of US 
transmission assets to RTOs is the maximum level of integration reached by FERC’s orders. The 
impact on market design convergence differs accordingly:  
Proposition 16: In the EU, member states gradually adopt one template of legal and functional 
unbundling, whereas across the Atlantic owners of transmission assets comply with operational 
rules established by the respective RTOs.  
VII. Synthesis: Regulatory Convergence, the Florence Consensus and an Agglomerative 
Magnet  
The puzzle of institutional diversity in US American and European electricity sector regulation has 
been, at least to some extent, clarified by positioning the major agents in their attitudes towards 
finding a new general model of sector organisation: A number of players seem to have similar 
objectives on both sides of the Atlantic, in particular academic communities who are actively 
supportive of regulatory convergence, and the newly emerging branch of electricity traders who 
develop standardised contracts, thus reinforcing a bottom-up harmonisation of practices. These two 
groups are in a minoritarian position, though, when confronted with the amount of agents pursuing the 
objective of preserving the old status quo. To this cluster belong the traditional utilities in the US and 
in the EU, the non-governmental organisations and consumer advocacy groups, who openly promote 
local diversity, and to some extent the large industrial users, who officially embrace convergence—but 
only as long as it does not harm their grandfathered privileges. Given the objectives of the entirety of 
those agents, electricity sector liberalisation should evolve in parallel paths in the US and in the EU, Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
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reinforced by a similar degree of structural path-dependence in respect to vertical integration and a 
‘balkanised’ ownership structure of transmission assets.  
However, our analysis suggests that property rights issues and the agendas of the above-mentioned 
agents are less influential than other emergent dynamics. In particular, decision-making in the EU is 
governed by a polity consensus about the benefits of an internal energy market, as being part of the 
commitment to a broad EU liberalisation agenda (Eising 2002: 114). The supra-national authority of 
the European Commission in the supervision of progress towards open and competitive markets is 
complemented by informal regulatory networks between grid operators, standardisation authorities 
and regulators, which fill the ‘regulatory gap’ left to member state discretion in the directives 
(Vasconcelos 2005, Eberlein and Grande 2005). As opposed to the Public Utilities Commissions in the 
United States, which have a long-lasting public service tradition, European energy regulatory agencies 
have been founded as a by-product of the liberalisation process and have their joint raison d’être in the 
implementation of free-market principles, similar to the Commission’s mission to maintain the 
momentum of ever-increasing European integration by the creation of a single trade area. 
Furthermore, an EU-wide academic network has formed and has been actively promoted by the 
Commission, for example via the SESSA programme. The academic network provides theoretical and 
educational input for politicians and the growing number of national regulators to assimilate congruent 
positions and practices, thereby contributing to institutional isomorphism by mimetic and normative 
adaptation. The tripartite coalition between the European Commission, informal regulatory networks 
and epistemic communities is exemplified in the ‘Florence Process.’ It has been instrumental in 
developing joint positions in the Florence Forum and subregional Mini-Fora, while being 
academically supported by the Florence School of Regulation. We would therefore suggest that market 
design convergence in the EU is energised and reinforced by a ‘Florence Consensus,’
15 which exhibits 
autodynamics beyond the formal control of national governments and somewhat substitutes and 
compensates the lack of a European-wide energy regulatory authority.  
The following graph maps the triangular relation graphically
16: Stretching across the core of 
technological, academic and political concordance, the Florence Consensus shows how the European 
                                                      
15   Despite using a similar nomenclature, the ‘Florence Consensus’ differs from the Washington Consensus in three 
important characteristics: First, in its autopoietic and somewhat loose nature as an alliance among meso-level political 
and economic agents and academic clusters. In contrast, the Washington Consensus reflected an accordance between 
some of the world’s most powerful institutions: the US federal government, and the Bretton Woods organisations World 
Bank and IMF, relying on theoretical input from the highly influential University of Chicago-based neoclassical school of 
economics, which – after years of failed import substitution policies and fiscal instability in developing countries, and a 
decline in the belief in Keynesian welfare-state economics in industrialised nations – had gained an almost paradigmatic 
status in the Western hemisphere. Second, the Washington Consensus was composed of a well-defined set of conditions 
of good governance, including fiscal discipline, interest rate liberalisation, a competitive exchange rate, etc. (Williamson 
2000), while the Florence Consensus has an evolving pattern of a common policy enterprise with no ex-ante defined 
regulatory preference beyond the pursuit of greater integration. As one interviewee involved in the Florence meetings 
describes it: ‘In Florence […] there has been no consensus among participants to be imposed outside: there has been a 
patient work of stakeholders with initially divergent positions towards a greater consistency in their attitudes, which is 
very useful but is still much less than a consensus.’ (Interview in January 2007, interviewee remains anonymous) Third, 
the global diffusion of policies based on the Washington Consensus was reinforced by the financial leverage that the 
international financial organisations could utilise by imposing some type of conditionality when they issued loans, in 
particular to developing countries, whereas the parties involved in the Florence Consensus can only rely on an 
informational advantage.  
16  In the centre, the core drivers for and elements of convergence are located: the European Commission, its Directives and 
the regulators for the European Union. Drivers – both in terms of agents and concepts – that impede or delay convergence 
are gradientially lined up when moving towards the periphery. Different underlying patterns indicate different spheres of 
influence: To the top (north), resistance from the political and socio-political sphere (north-west) and political economy 
fields (north-east) increases. To the right (east), adverse corporate interests are depicted. To the bottom, technological and 
structural constraints dominate. Finally, the left (south-west and north-west) depicts opposition from academic clusters 
and think tanks, respectively. For obvious reasons, these fields are overlapping. For instance, technology bears a 
component of strategic corporate interests, the academic input of new design proposals as well as political influence. Jens Weinmann 
34  EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/15 © Jens Weinmann 
Commission’s strive towards convergence benefits from the academic support of epistemic 
communities as well as the technological and informational coordination of transnational regulatory 
networks in liaison with the regional transmission coordination organisation. The graph also shows 
that the EU also has a number of actors that are located far from the centre, though: Especially nation 
states have an ambivalent position by promoting convergence in accession countries and 
geographically close regions, while pursuing policies of economic patriotism on domestic grounds. 
Similarly, vertically integrated utilities use their informational advantages in respect to technology in 
order to defend their territorial incumbency. However, the force of the Consensus seems to prevail. 
One satellite of particular mimetic convergence emerges in respect to the EU’s diffusion of the 
Virtual Power Plants model instead of outright divestitures, indicated by the sub-circle with the dashed line.  
Figure 1: Convergence Map EU  
(distance from the centre indicates diverging positions towards standardisation) 
 
In contrast, the evolution in the United States has drifted from an initial embracing of market 
principles into a diffuse spectrum of atomistic attitudes about how to proceed with liberalisation, 
exacerbated by regulatory failures like the first Californian market architecture and corporate failures 
like Enron. FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, has hampered the process of 
convergence by the attempt to rapidly impose a standard design of ‘organised markets,’ whose 
efficiency is questioned as not being liberal enough by industry lobbying groups, a number of 
academics and neo-liberal think tanks, whereas consumer advocacy groups and public power utilities 
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supply structures. Most importantly, public utilities commissions of a significant number of states 
oppose any standardised top-down approach to regulatory convergence.  
The following graph maps the current situation in the USA. In the centre, the core drivers for and 
elements of convergence are located: FERC, its Standard Market Design and the Regional 
Transmission Organisations. Merchant generators, traders, some epistemic communities as well as 
some pro-competitive public utilities commissions appreciate FERCs proposals, while almost all other 
agents are openly opposed. In the graph, Renewable Portfolio Standards have their autonomous 
evolution across the states, a feature that has been discussed in section IV.C; therefore they are 
distinguished by a sub-circle with dashed lines 
Figure 2: Convergence Map US  
(distance from the centre indicates diverging positions towards standardisation) 
It appears likely that for the foreseeable future large parts of the United States, especially in the 
South-East and the North-West, will have no incentive to adopt the predominant model of the 
regionally most integrated markets in the North-East. Seen from the perspective of classical 
democratic control, resistance from US state authorities, lobbying groups and grass-roots movements 
bears a stronger component of democratic participation and legitimacy than the ‘opaque’ EU decision-
making process, thereby coming close to Tiebout’s theory of multiple regulatory equilibria and 
corresponding to the American ideal of ‘regulatory federalism.’ 
Market design convergence in the USA will be constrained to the incremental, radial expansion 
linked to the creation of regional transmission organisations, which reduce technical and procedural 
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an ‘agglomerative magnet’
17 by attracting an increasing number of companies in geographical 
proximity of RTOs. 
Similar to informal regulatory networks, the ‘agglomerative magnet’ type of diffusion in the North-
Eastern states of the USA can significantly contribute to the adoption of a single model. By definition, 
it remains a regional phenomenon, though. It differs from regulatory networks in that it offers the 
possibility for each constituency to individually decide whether to join the regime or establish an 
independent design. The magnet metaphor also points to the fact that for a newly participating entity 
the rules of the game are already predefined by the existing model, and any desired modifications are 
likely to face severe obstacles, thus adding a layer of path-dependence to the process that—assuming 
that the initial design is not yet perfect—prevents the system from reaching optimality with an 
increasing number of participants. 
VIII. Conclusions and Outlook 
One of the lessons of more than a century of commercial power supply is that the electricity sector is 
always in a state of criticality, be it induced by the alternating topics of security of supply, the 
efficiency of public enterprises, generation technologies, the public service character and equity, or 
environmental concerns. As a critical infrastructure component the electricity industry is not likely to 
be spared from political interventionism on a cyclical basis. Insofar, any theory of a lasting regulatory 
equilibrium would probably fail to provide a sufficient explanation, since that equilibrium is fragile 
and in a process of constant redefinition. Theories of regulatory competition, which set up conditions 
for market design convergence (or diversity) and identify the relevant mechanisms, are more easily 
applicable to the sector. Conventional theories like the race-to-the-top or race-to-the-bottom 
approaches can only be validated for peripheral features of market designs, though, like the previously 
discussed Renewable Portfolio Standards in the US or the resistance of renewable energies marketers 
to lobby for European-wide renewables standards in the EU. Tiebout’s classical equilibrium model, on 
the contrary, represents a valid approach to describe the phenomenon of regulatory federalism 
encountered in the diversity of market designs in the USA. However, it has to be complemented with 
the agglomerative magnet as a parallel development. The reasons for the diffusion of the North-
Eastern market model despite the sustained resistance of multiple, nationally organised interest groups 
are complex, especially when considering the motivation of individual corporate grid owners shifting 
operational responsibility to RTOs, but they point to the success of FERC’s organisational learning 
process leading to the selection of a second-best strategy to foster convergence. The European 
Commission has also embarked on a second-best strategy by circumventing the authority of national 
governments in its institutional support for informal regulatory networks. The increase of independent 
regulatory agencies outside the traditional Anglo-American context (see Gilardi et al. 2006 for an 
analysis of Europe and Latin America) indicates that even in regions with a less institutionally stable 
environment than the EU transnational regulatory networks may play a major role in the diffusion of 
best practices and become a driver for convergence in regulatory competition within the foreseeable 
future. North’s theory of path-dependence can be applied to both the continental European and the US 
American ownership structure of the industry, while Roe’s (1996) observation that major (legal) 
changes occur only as a response to system breakdowns may not fully describe the evolution of sector 
reforms in the USA: The reform movement started off in states with high electricity costs and as a 
spillover effect from other formerly regulated industries—hence not from an outright crisis of the 
system. Roe’s theory of inertia can to some extent be helpful in understanding the subsequent events, 
                                                      
17  Dunning (1998: 51) uses this terminology in respect to the choice of location of multinational enterprises: ‘There is a 
suggestion, too, that the presence of other foreign investors in a particular country is becoming more significant, both as 
an ‘investment-stalk’ or signalling effect to other firms less familiar with that country […], and as an agglomerative 
magnet by which firms benefit from being part of a geographical network or cluster of related activities and specialized 
support services.’ Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe 
EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/15 © Jens Weinmann  37 
though: The repercussions induced by the California market crash and Enron’s bankruptcy shattered 
the belief in liberalised markets and motivated many state commissions and politicians to stick to the 
old models instead of experimenting with new forms of governance, thus revealing an instinctive 
conservatism when confronted with uncertainty and change. Modelling, policy bandwagoning and 
imitation have not been identified as core drivers of regulatory convergence in the USA and 
continental Europe, but they may occur in other regions of the world, in particular in industrialised 
countries outside the major trading blocks, in isolated systems and in the emerging economies in 
South-East Asia (for a categorisation of global drivers of market design convergence, please see 
Weinmann 2007). Also, late-starters like Texas and Ireland with their independent grids and, after the 
initial design failure, California have been actively seeking to unify best practices from regimes elsewhere.  
Global electricity sector liberalisation is at a critical point in its development: Especially in North 
America claims of reversal and a return to the old system of vertical integration and rate-of-return 
regulation—according to Watts (2001) still the most effective hedging option for consumers against 
high prices and for suppliers against too low prices—find supporters among politicians, small 
consumers and even the industry. The existing market designs have still not delivered the expected 
benefits in terms of retail choice or price decreases due to competitive pressures (Ruff 2003); they are 
rather considered an illegitimate transfer of power from public utilities commissions who act in the 
best interest of their customers (Morrison 2005) to anonymous, federally imposed super-agencies. The 
criticism is reinforced by spiralling costs for the new regulatory organisations and system operators 
(APPA 2004). But also in many countries of continental Europe liberalisation is perceived to have 
unilaterally benefited the producers and suppliers of electricity, which are now allowed to operate 
under a short-termist, Darwinian business logic, exploiting their market dominance to impoverish 
residential consumers while disrespecting their societal responsibilities, polluting the environment 
with dirty and cheap technologies and failing to secure adequate investments in generation and 
transmission extensions.  
One of the principal reasons why resistance to market design convergence in the US and, to some 
extent, in Europe is outspoken and successful can be found in the fact that no single model has 
emerged as the favourite mode of reorganising the sector efficiently and under criteria of finding the 
balance between market forces and business logic on the one hand, and resource adequacy and 
reliability on the other hand, thus impeding Campbell’s ‘convergent evolution.’ (1969: 78) While most 
scholars challenge the necessity of price caps and capacity payments, as they exist in the North-East 
US, the additional benefits of nodal versus zonal transmission pricing schemes, the appropriate 
signalling of investment incentives by financial transmission rights, mechanisms of market coupling, 
organised versus fragmented dispatches, the role of power exchanges and trading, and the implicit or 
explicit allocation of cross-border transmission capacity are theoretically contested and practically 
often unresolved. Not only different phenotypes of markets, but also genotypes of designs exist on 
both sides of the Atlantic, which gives rise to the impression that the academic community, which 
should take the role as guiding entity in a joint ‘policy enterprise,’ is atomised in itself. In that 
environment (and well outside the EU), niche designs like cost-based pools or the previously described 
Oregon model might even survive without eventually transforming into more widespread schemes. 
The multitude of positions and strategies portrayed in this analysis suggests that in both the United 
States and in Europe the power of one unifying design model does not exist. While the EU 
compensates this crucial component of restructuring by incremental trial-and-error learning fostered 
by the Florence Consensus, the USA has predominantly embarked on two trajectories: the first leading 
to radially expanding convergence of ‘organised markets’ under the auspices of regional transmission 
organisations, and the second in largely preserving the status quo of the traditional, locally adapted 
model under a form of anti-federal grassroots empowerment and protective parochialism. Jens Weinmann 
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